CASR

———
A Modest
Proposal
———

Canadian Navy  –  JSS Alternative  –  Mod Prop  –  Oct 2010 (updated Mar 2011) Bay Class: Brisk Movement Required When Opportunity Knocks – Ship Buying and Ship Building  as a  Simple Alternative  to JSS A Modest Proposal  by  Steve Daly, CD Update:  17 March 2011 –  Australian MoD, Stephen Smith, announced today that his country has formally bid on the surplus Bay class ship. Australian officials explored a lease option unsuccessfully. The formal bid is for full purchase of  that Bay class LSD. The United Kingdom's current  Strategic Review  includes a proposed trimming of the Royal Navy's existing assets.  Some vessels are to be mothballed to allow future ship, submarine, and  aircraft carrier projects to continue.  Others will be sold off  to free-up funds and crews for what remains of the current RN fleet. So,  Britain  finds itself over- stocked with ships – exactly the opposite situation to Canada's under-equipped Navy. One of several major British vessels to be discarded will be a member of the Bay class Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary or LSD(A) described by the British MoD as "... a  commercial  exploitation of  the  Royal Schelde's [ now Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding] Enforcer." From that original Enforcer concept sprang two other amphibious warfare classes significant  to Canadians: the joint Dutch / Spanish  LSD IIs and  the upcoming Dutch Joint Support Ship ( JSS or JLOS ) concept. [1] Unlike Canada,  the United Kingdom still  has a substantial merchant marine providing a core of  potential recruits  for both  the Royal Naval  and  the  Royal Naval Reserve – similar to Canada's much smaller NAVRES (but without the latter's training emphasis). But the Royal Navy also has a form of reserve force unheard of in Canada,  the civilian Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA).[2]  And  it is this RFA which staff the Bay class LSD(A)s. Gently-Used Bay Class on Offer – One Service's Fire Sale is Another's Opportunity Britain has not yet announced which of  the Bay class LSD(A)s is to be retired but all four ships of this class are comparatively new (being delivered between Dec 2005 and July 2007). So how can this retirement benefit Canada? The Bay class is at the modest end of the 'Honking Big Ship' that emerged in DND planning a few years back. It is not an auxiliary oiler replenishment ship of the type needed to replace Canada's Protecteur class AORs. Put another way, the Bay class is Canada's planned Joint Support Ship or JSS without the hoses but a Bay class is a lot more capable in amphibious operations. Unlike Canada's JSS concept, the Bay class is a proven design  –  both in general as a member of the Enforcer family and specifically as a British LSD(A). As a hull designed to modern, commercial standards, [3] the Bay class are also highly automated resulting in a reduced crew  –  as planned,  JSS will require 241, the Bay class  only 60.  That Bay class complement count  does not  include landing craft crews launching from the rear, ramped wet well  (that ramp and wet well being features which JSS will lack altogether). This Bay class could fill  the sort of  command and control, and  amphibious roles that having been fraying from DND's original JSS concept.  Indeed, the Bay class is exactly the sort of ship that Canada needed when responding to the earthquake in Haiti. It has a large helicopter deck,  1200 linear metres of  vehicle space,  and room for 24 TEU (ISO containers) full of  relief supplies and equipment. More importantly, a Bay class carries its own ship-to-shore transport in the form of landing craft and motorized causeway.[4] The Pitfalls and Potential Flies in the Ointment  ...  or  ... There's Always a Downside Public relations is always the biggest hurdle to a proposal to buy used military equipment for the Canadian Forces –  especially British- built naval vessels. Beyond the anticipated kneejerk reactions to 'used' gear of any kind, lurks the spectre of Canada's used British submarines – semi-operational a decade on. An important distinction is that those Upholder/Victoria class subs sat mothballed at dockside for ten years before being sold to Canada. Nor is that class of submarine still in service in its country of origin  –  and  this proved to be a major factor  in difficulties experienced in procuring parts.  The Bay class,  by contrast,  are currently operational with the RN and  will continue to be so after  the planned retirement of  the single hull. That single Bay class hull is another problem. The Canadian Forces currently have an initial requirement for two Joint Support Ships. But only  one  Bay class LSD(A)  is on offer. There are obvious parts and training problems to operating any 'orphan' class  – especially a single, foreign-built, hull type designed to another nation's specifications. Another unknown is the expected price for the surplus Bay class vessel. The two new Canadian-built JSS are expected to cost in the range of $2.6B. Total costs for the Bay class (when brand new) were in the range of £485M (including the design and initial spares) or $786M at current exchange rates. [5] So, a single used Bay class vessel with spares could realistically be priced no higher than $197M ...  making it  $394M  for two. Possible Approaches and Potential Solutions ... or Sidling Up to Slightly-Used Ships Among the ships to be cut in the UK's current Strategic Review is another amphibious warfare type, a single Albion class Landing Platform Dock. This was only ever a class of two – HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark  (delivered in 2003 and 2005 ). So, the MoD's existing plan will  leave the  Royal Navy with an 'orphan' class of  a single Albion LPD. An opportunity exists for Canada to acquire both a  Bay class LSD(A)  and an  Albion class LPD.  Detractors would  point out  that  the Albion class is  somewhat  more ship than Canada actually requires. Certainly  the Albion class are  more capable ships than the Bay class but that comes at a cost. The complement for an Albion is 325 compared with 60  (plus the landing craft crews)  for the Bay class. Such differences matter when Canada's Navy already experiences great difficulty crewing the ships that it has now. What Britain and Canada share in their interest in these vessels is the desirability of  a quick sale. That puts DND and PWGSC in an unfamiliar position ( for them ) of  having to play hardball.  The UK  faces fleet reductions and  has floated  the idea of sales and mothballing ships. Canada should counter with a quick-sale proposal.  It could be this:   The Royal Navy retains both  Albion class LPDs while releasing two   Bay class LSD(A)s  instead.  The rationale is simple.  The RN avoids   an orphan class albeit with increased personnel requirements (which   Britain is better able to bear).  Canada buys  the two,  now-redundant   Bay class LSD(A)s, thereby avoiding its own mixed fleet of  orphans. And the hardball part? DND must make one, firm proposal not open negotiations. The deal would be: two Bay class at a mutually-agreeable price or nothing at all. Britain will either see an advantage in retaining its second LPD for the Royal Marines or it will not. The Joint Support Ships,  Zombified Projects,  and  Effects on Canadian Shipbuilding Buying existing,  proven ships from an ally will speed up procurement but how will this approach eclipse JSS? And  how does this proposal not fly in the face of  the recently- announced National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy ( NSPS ) ? The answer to both questions comes from the second part of this increasingly less-than-modest proposal. JSS  experienced  a capability-creep, turning Maritime Staff's pet scheme into a budget- consuming Hydra. In its earliest incarnation – the Afloat Logistics Sealift Capability or ALSC project  –  JSS was to be a 'one-ship-does-it-all'. That form has devolved into an 'enhanced-AOR', an oiler with plug-in options to expand into other roles in future. The Navy is now considering conventional AORs meaning that JSS is dead in all but name. More than any other DND endeavour, JSS shows that projects do not die just because they've stopped making any sense. Without a stake through their heart,  these become zombie projects – seemingly moribund but still slurping up Project Management Office funds while laying claim to cubicle space in  National Defence Headquarters buildings. As a keystone of the government's NSPS, JSS has become the living dead. The Harper Conservatives have said that they will build JSS and, past experience shows, that they will do just that – even if it has ceased to make sense. Time to domesticate this zombie. The NSPS and  the industrial side of  the JSS project can still be satisfied.  If  the Brits agree to selling Canada two LSD(A)s, a part of  the funding earmarked  for JSS can be put towards a modest 'Canadianization' of  the Bay class. Then, a revised JSS project could create two new, direct replacements for Canada's aging Protecteur class AORs.   This revised  JSS project would result in two, more conventional   AORs built  in whichever  Canadian shipyard is chosen through   the NSPS process. These new CF AORs would  be based on the   Enforcer hull for maximum commonality with Canada's 'new' Bay   class LSD(A). A similar ship has already been built, the Spanish   A-15 Cantabria. [6]  So, conceptually at least, JSS would be the   Cantabria superstructure and deck equipment wedded to a hull   and  propulsion systems  as similar to the Bay class' as possible. Political Promises Kept,  Industry Employed,  Old AORs Replaced,  Everybody Happy Canada's Navy needs replacement oilers which can be addressed by building Enforcer based AORs in Canada. But we should not anticipate ship exports. We are warned by the Export Development Corporation not  to expect much potential in selling Canadian manufactured goods abroad in the near future.[7] Selling technical expertise is another matter. AORs with Bay class commonality gives a Canadian yard the design-rights for any future Enforcer-based AORs. Canadian shipyards may not be competitive on the ways but that does not mean that our expertise cannot become an export commodity. In light of  the promises made  both for military procurement and  supporting Canadian industry  through the NSPS,  the acquisition of  used Bay class ships might be seen as politically sensitive. It needn't be.  A 'Canadianization' refit will provide local shipyards with work under the NSPS. If dedicated AORs are added through a revised JSS project, hull construction work is provided  to Canadian shipyards. And  there is a side benefit in the midst of  difficult times  for  traditional exports. Canada would  have available an exportable commodity  – AOR expertise based on a highly-successful commercial  hull. Maritime Staff have redefined their JSS project time and again. Perhaps Government should take a leaf from DND's book. Buy the two Bay class LSD(A)s, build the Enforcer-hulled AOR replacements in Canada, and tie-off the sad saga of DND's Joint Support Ship Project. [1] LSD IIs are the Dutch Rotterdam/Johan de Witt and Spanish Galicia/Castilia. The Netherland's JSS/JLOS concept now under construction will be HrMs Karel Doorman. [2] A civilian force, the RFA has over 2,000 officers and ratings. RFA qualifications are to merchant marine standards but all RFA personnel are obliged to "go in harm's way". [3] Bay class were built to Class 1 Passenger Ship Certification commercial standards. [4] In their well deck, Royal Navy Bay class carry a single utility landing craft (the 30m LCU Mk 10 ) which can carry 100 personnel, a heavy Armoured Engineer Vehicle, or a range of smaller vehicles. Alternately, a pair of vehicle landing craft (15.7m LCVP Mk 5) are used which can carry 35 personnel, two utility trucks, or 2 tons of equipment. Two LCVP Mk 5s can be stored on deck, hoisted down to augment the craft in the wet well. The Bays can also carry two motorized Mexeflote rafts which can also be employed as landing craft in calm waters or joined together to form a floating causeway from ship's rear ramp to shore. When approaching a landing site, the Mexeflote rafts are rigged to either side of the Bay's hull  (temporarily increasing overall width from 26.4m to 32.2m). [5] Original construction cost was pegged at £37M per hull but escalated dramatically. Lead yard, Swan Hunter, received an another £62M to provide design and services to BAE Systems (which built the final Bay pair) plus £11M for initial spares for the class. [6] Cantabria is effectively a double-hulled version of Patiño, in turn, based on HrMs Amsterdam – precursor of the Enforcer family of ships to which the Bay class belongs. [7] See Global Export Forecast - Fall 2010. The lack of potential for Canadian shipyards was compounded by the recent removal of the 20% tariff on imported commercial hulls.