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In Detail —— ‘Breaking  the Ice’: Planning a Deep Water Port at Iqaluit ——

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Canada's Arctic Sovereignty  –  Iqaluit Deep Water Port  –  April 2006 Armed Icebreakers and Arctic Ports for Canada's North? Costing Three New Canadian Heavy Armed Icebreakers Stephen Priestley, Researcher, Canadian American Strategic Review (CASR) Update:  On 10 August 2007,  Prime Minister  Stephen Harper announced  that  the Canadian Forces would develop a new naval base at the existing deepwater port at Nanisivik, further north on Baffin Island. Perceived advantages include: a strategic location on the Northwest Passage, pre-exisiting dock and refuelling infrastructure, and a nearby airstrip. Downsides are a gravel runway  –  Iqaluit has the only paved runway in Nunavut  –  and the capital of  Nunavut is left without a deep water port. Costing large, heavy icebreakers in Canada presents two major challenges. No major icebreaker projects have been costed in this country since the cancelled Polar 8 (which would have cost around $500M in 1984 dollars). Nor have the Conservative Party (or Stephen Harper’s new govern- ment ) given out any details about the size or capabilities of  the promised  heavy  armed  icebreakers  for the Navy. The two existing  Canadian Coast Guard  heavy icebreakers shed little light on costs. The CCGS Louis S St-Laurent (120 metres long and displacing 11,500 tonnes – above, left ) was built in 1969. Originally contracted for $55M (in 1967 dollars) costs over-ran to $80M by the time she was completed. The CCGS Terry Fox (a smaller ship displacing 4,250t, 88m long) was built in 1983 for oil exploration. Her layout would be ill-suited to any naval use. So, we must make assumptions about intended size and capabilities before making any estimates on construction costs for a modern , heavy armed icebreaker. Below is a highly conjectural layout. We have assumed a length of about 120m, a medium calibre deck gun, and a flight deck/hangar suitable for the coming CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopter. Although ‘stealth’ isn’t a concern (visibility being an asset for sovereignty assertion), enclosed masts/sensors are shown (to limit build-up of ice).

To find a ‘ballpark’ figure for our armed icebreaker,  let’s look at the most recently built US Polar class icebreaker. The 128m USCGC Healy was costed at about US$ 25,000  (or about $28,700 Canadian)  per ton to build. The Healy displaces around 16,000 tons, so total cost for the vessel was about US$400M (or $460M Canadian). In all likelihood , the Healy is somewhat larger than what the Tories have in mind, but it is also an “open ocean” icebreaker. The tougher ice conditions of the ‘inland’ waters of  Canada’s  Arctic Archipelago will require construction from specially hardened steel – stronger  but  at a correspondingly greater expense. Armament costs need not be so great. Ice-resistance warships (Denmark’s frigate- sized Thetis class, for example) are lightly armed.  Canada also has an opportunity to recycle the 76mm guns from its aging destroyers.  Other systems are simplified of necessity – for example, the usual sonar dome mounted on the hull bottom just wouldn’t survive [1] and, of course, torpedos would be of no use at all in the ice. “You know what they say about assumptions”  –   Some Rough Cost Estimates If we assume a round figure of $450M per armed icebreaker (allowing for specially- hardened steel, armament and other naval equipment), then the cost for the Tories three proposed vessels would be $1.35B.  Added to that must at  least  $105M for building a new deep-water port at Iqaluit for a total of  $1.455B.  The Conservative Party announcement allowed $2B for this project. The problem is, just over $500M is left for construction of a new base and barracks, port infrastructure (outside the berths) not to mention shipbuilding (or construction) cost overruns. Other Costs Inherent in Armed Naval Icebreakers Perhaps this is stating the obvious but  the CF has no personnel experienced in icebreaker operations. The Canadian Coast Guard could second ice pilots (although this could cause seniority conflicts ) but, under  the existing plan , the remainder of  the crew would  need  re-training  in icebreaking  techniques. Along with building up Arctic operations experience among its deck officers, the Navy would also have to retrain its boarding parties (operating among drifting ice is dangerous for any vessel but could quickly become lethal for sailors in RHIBs). The most expeditious solution would be to have experienced CCG personnel train the Navy in northern ops and icebreaking techniques (although CASR’s position is that it would be simpler still to second naval crews to man guns on CCG ships). It is likely that CF personnel will regard Iqaluit as a ‘hardship post’  (the Air Force have not been keen to man a CF-18 detachment at YFB). So, along with the higher cost of  living  ‘north of 60’,  there will also be higher barracks construction costs, plus pay bonuses for 500 sailors, technicians, and other support personnel based at Iqaluit. At this stage, it is impossible to put a price tag on these additonal costs. Of course, there are also the costs of transits south for annual / major maintenance and repair of the CF icebreakers. Such costs are now incurred for the CCG vessels. The real question is  whether the CCG’s current Arctic operations or a new armed icebreaker will do the best job of asserting Canadian sovereignty in Arctic waters. The answer to that will determine the true value of the promised Tory icebreakers. Update:  On 09 July 2007,  Prime Minister Harper announced a plan to procure six- to-eight “Arctic / Offshore Patrol Ships”. These vessels would act as OPVs in the Pacific and Atlantic most of  the year,  venturing into the Arctic Ocean only in the summer months – wags immediately dubbed the proposed ships “slushbreakers”. The A/OPS aren’t the “armed naval heavy icebreakers“ promised during the 2005- 2006 election campaign but  they would represent the first genuine Arctic-capable Canadian naval vessels since HMCS Labrador was paid off in November of  1957. [1] The old ice-hardened AORs had retractable hull sonar domes. These C4 sonar systems proved high-maintenance and  have since been removed from the AORs.