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In Detail —— CIBUA: an Alternative to the MGS ——

by Matt Fisher ( USMC )

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Defence Procurement  —  February 2004 Canada's Leopard Tank ... More Than One Life for This CAT? Matt Fisher considers one possible alternative to the CF’s Mobile Gun System Part 1 — City CAT:  an Argument for a Dedicated CIBUA Leopard Conversion Ed: In October of 2003, DND approved the purchase of  66 new Mobile Gun Systems (MGS) for the Canadian Forces. Based on the chassis and drivetrain of the LAV III, MGS has been widely criticized as being overly vulnerable for its intended role of direct-fire support. Author Matt Fisher reminds us of another, even more arduous mission –  that of ‘combat in built-up areas’. A solution for the challenging urban warfare environment may be close at hand through a relatively simple conversion. Current plans for the CF’s Land Forces include the complete retirement of all the remaining Leopard main battle tanks.  Many of the Leopard tanks were recently modernized and uparmoured to Leopard C2 standards. But, all are to be replaced soon with the highly controversial wheeled 8x8 MGS ( Mobile Gun Systems). [1] While the 105mm MGS will have key benefits – such as logistics and maintenance commonality with the current  LAV III APC  fleet, excellent on-road mobility, and lower operating cost (compared with tracked vehicles)  –  it does not represent an ideal replacement for the current Leopard MBT operated by the Canadian Forces. “Ask me for an image of civilization, and I'll show you the sack of a great city.” As evidenced by the conflicts of the 20th century, urban warfare –  or ‘combat in built-up areas’ (CIBUA) – has become increasingly common.  The conflicts in the opening years of the 21st century show that this trend will likely continue.  It has also been shown that, when operating in CIBUA situations, the attacking infantry requires some sort of armoured direct fire support to operate effectively. This has been proven repeatedly in places like Stalingrad, Ortona, Berlin, Hue, Mogadishu, and Grozny. The Mogadishu example is particularly fitting in that the lessons of tank-infantry cooperation were not applied.  This resulted in heavy losses by US troops which relied on ‘soft-skinned’ vehicles for ground-based fire support. Like those soft-skinned Humvees and 5-ton trucks used in Mogadishu,  the LAV-based MGS lacks the survivability and the mobility to be well-suited to CIBUA engagements – as reinforced by Russian Army experiences in the bitter street-fighting for Grozny. Light armour was particularly vulnerable with the wheeled LAVs also lacking manoeuvrability. For the MGS, the conclusion which must be drawn is that the vehicle’s armour is too weak for CIBUA.  To survive in modern urban warfare, the direct fire support vehicles must be able to withstand multiple, close-range hits by light anti-armour weapons  –  such as cheap and handy RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers which now equip regular infantry and guerrillas thoughout much of the world. [1]  The 105mm-armed MGS was developed as the fire-support member of the US Army’s Stryker family of vehicles based on the Canadian-made LAV III chassis. >  Part 2  —  CIBUA Mobility:  ‘...  As the Wheeled Turns ...’