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Canadian Defence Procurement – December
2004
Auditing the Upgrades to the CF-18 Fighter Aircraft
[Part 5]
The Auditor-General reviews the CF-18
Incremental Modernization Project
Conclusions Drawn From (and Implications of) the Audit of DND's CF-18 IMP
Minor technical problems with some of the equipment installed under the CF-18 Incremental Modernization Project
(related to the new software and radios) were noted by the auditors. However, this was not a technological review
(contractual and management procedures were the main object of the audit). Of necessity, the auditors relied
upon DND's assessment and response to these technical glitches.
[DND] was investigating these problems at the time of our audit. [DND]
officials told us the Director of Technical Airworthiness was examining the engineering test and evaluation trouble
reports and had provided a provisional technical airworthiness clearance [signifying] that there are no significant
airworthiness issues and is provided pending resolution of the remaining issues. The [CF-18 IMP] staff and technical
airworthiness staff were working toward full technical airworthiness clearance in the fall of 2004. ... [DND] told us
that it is satisfied with the performance of the modernized aircraft now in service. |
Standardized monthly progress reports were found lacking. Only two of the five projects assessed had regular progress
reports to senior management. Auditors "expected to find regular status reporting...because of the
interdependencies of the upgrades". Instead, they were informed that PWGSC bases their "reporting
requirement for each contract...'on contract complexity and political sensitivity'." So, despite their
reservations about the lack of progress reports, OAG auditors found the work done to be "in accordance with the
[PWGSC] Supply Manual".
What fell within the accepted practices still had implications for the success of the CF-18 IMP in the future. The auditors concluded:
Improvements to project and risk management are needed before [DND]
continues with the Phase 2 upgrade projects. There are impediments to the successful outcome of Phase 2 that can be
addressed by a review of staffing, better project control through planning and reporting, a better understanding of
risk management, and implementing the risk manage- ment plan it now has. If these areas are not addressed, [DND] is
putting at risk its ability to get full value from its $2.6 billion investment...
There are also factors outside the direct scope of the CF-18 [IMP] that need to be addressed ... to ensure that it
attains the full investment value of upgrading the CF-18s. [DND] needs to address the personnel shortages that threaten
its ability to fly the CF-18s and [to] keep them properly maintained. As well, it needs to resolve support funding
issues. |
Add ASTRA — To the Stars Through Structural Analysis?
In response to the auditors' concerns about the ability of the modernized CF-18 fleet to meet all commitments, DND
noted that it has "analysis tools to monitor and match resources with commitments" citing the Air Force
Structural Analysis model as an example (ASTRA calculates resources needed to meet commitments).
Reassuring as that may be to DND, it does not take into account that modernized Phase 1 CF-18s are being delivered to
squadrons which may be little better able to complete the types of missions which prompted the CF-18 IMP than unmodified
aircraft. Not a very impressive return for the $1.5B invested in Phase 1. Of course, the fruits of Phase 1 will not
really become apparent until Phase 2 is completed.
Slippages in Phase 1 mean that potentially impressive aircraft systems cannot be integrated until Phase 2. Nor can
CF-18 pilots (what there are of them) be trained to make full use of installed upgrades let alone future potential.
Instead, desktop trainers must stand in until the needlessly-delayed full simulators are delivered.
Conclusions on the CF-18 Incremental Modernization Project's Progress
Having voiced their concerns and made recommendations about "problems with project and risk management, staff
shortages, and approval delays", the auditors were, for the most part, satisfied with Phase 1 of the CF-18 IMP.
The Incremental Modernization Project is a huge undertaking and the audit was largely restricted to questions of how
well and how effectively the project was being managed by the responsible departments, DND, PWGSC, and TB.
Questions about whether DND choices of future roles and upgrade priorities for the CF-18 are appropriate were beyond
the scope of the audit. Those questions are left to the rest of us.
Delays should be expected in projects of this complexity. But this also means that delays should be anticipated by
planners. Now, aircraft which were only meant to serve until 2003 will not even be fully upgraded until 2009. Yet other
operators of the F/A-18 aircraft seem to have had less difficulty with their upgrade programs.
When the CF-18 IMP is finally completed, these upgraded aircraft may be among the best fighters of their generation.
But, by then, this generation will be 30 years old. Despite minimal structural improvements, these aged aircraft will
be expected to perform ground attack missions – often involving violent manoeuvring at low altitude.
Air Force planners chose this type of airframe-punishing mission so that Canada could be seen to 'do its bit'.
The alternative was to preserve the CF-18's remaining airframe life by focusing on the lower-strain intercept
role. Few nations can afford the current generation of fighter aircraft. In light of that, it might have been wiser to
preserve the assets we have rather than trying to please our allies.
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