CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
Review

Blast  Resistant  Vehicles  –  CF Armoured Fighting Vehicles  –  December 2006 Blast-Resistant  Vehicles  For  Beginners   —   Applique or 'Add-on' Armour and the Case for Blast-Resistant Support Stephen Priestley, Researcher, Canadian American Strategic Review (CASR) Armouring Kits,  Applique,  Add-On,  or Bolt-On Armour ...  call it what you will Covering ‘soft skinned’ bodywork with armour plate (or putting another layer of armour on top of original armour bodies)  is the simplest, least expensive,  and most popular method of giving additional protection to existing designs. Many vehicle are now designed from the outset for ‘armour kits’. The idea is that the vehicle can then be tailored to an exact environment at any threat level. So, frugal and flexible at a glance. Retro-fitting  applique armour onto a ‘soft skinned’ adds a level of protection which previously did not exist. The bolt-on armour panel for the CF’s LSVW (left) are an example. By all accounts, the LSVW kit is an extremely good one. But, as in all things, there is a cost –  taxing an already underpowered vehicle. The flaws of  the LSVW do not reflect directly on armour kits but they do illustrate a point.  In most cases, the vehicle was not originally intended to carry the added weight of applique armour. [1]  To limit weight gain, the designers of armour kits must restrict their efforts to critical areas  –  generally armour glass windows and immediate protection for crew in the form of blast blankets, armour panel inserts, and, sometimes, armour door replacements. DRDC blast experiments with the LSVW had shown the difficulty of protecting conventional light vehicles. The obvious problem is fitting the plates while still allowing access to components for maintenance. Less obvious is structural considerations. The weight of  add-on armour places a strain on the frame of an LSVW but, in contrast with a  monocoque armour hull, that armour contributes nothing to the overall structural integrity of the vehicle. So, apply armour kits to light support vehicles like the LSVW provides a  modicum of  protection at critical points but taxes both frame and already overstressed mechanical systems. As a result, these ‘support’ vehicles rarely leave the compounds and then only at great risk.[2] The usefulness of 5/4t support was already in question –  Kandahar provides the answer. [3] “The Future’s So Bright,  I Gotta Wear Shades ...”  or  Where to Go From Here There is an economy of scale in larger logistics vehicles (and it is easier to protect heavier trucks with armour kits). But the downsides of  armour kits apply as much to HLVWs as to LSVWs.  And, at  times, more small  vehicles headed  in different directions is the most efficient way to move cargo. Supplying combat forces in the field or FOBs may benefit from heavier vehicles but, once levels of security allows increased PRT activity in south-eastern Afghanistan, small loads being sent off to more places will certainly become the norm for CF logistics operations once again. So,  how can smaller  logistics vehicles be protected from blast? The simplest way to create blast-resistant trucks is to start with blast-resistant  vehicles.  In  South  Africa, this approach was applied to their Casspir APC. The result was the Biesbok logistics carrier which was protected from mines (although the cargo bed was unarmoured). The Biesbok (and similar Duiker tanker) had a tactical advantage in looking much like any other logistics vehicle at a glance. [4] But the Biesbok is obsolete and out of production. With the available time frame, we must look to a current production blast-resistant vehicle. The obvious candidate is the RG-31 in CF service as APVs. A logistics RG-31 (the Sabre) was offered but load-carrying was  limited. To match LSVW load-carrying with APV levels of  blast-resistance, a  stretch is  needed. The slightly larger RG-33 model will  be available in both a 4x4 and a 6x6 layout. Likewise, adding tandem rear axles to the RG-31 involves simple, off-the-self items. Quite naturally, all armies want to focus their resources at ‘the sharp end’. This is doubly true for the perpetually cash-starved Canadian Forces.  Now that budgets are larger, what must be recognized is that supply is now part of  that ‘sharp end’. The business of logistics may continue as before out of theatre but, in south-east Afghanistan, supply vehicles on the road will be prime targets aside from the PRT project sites. Future conditions demand that we look beyond counter-insurgency. [1] This problem first became apparent with the newly-acquired G-wagon LUVWs. [2] Other than supply missions, the LSVW’s comparative vulnerabilty also effects ambulance operations. ‘Outside the wire’, there is great reliance on 8x8 Bison and on US Humvees, usually HMMWV M996 ambulances or M997 ‘maxi-ambulances’. [3] The usefulness of Light Support (5/4 tons or otherwise) can remains a separate debate. What Kandahar shows is that armour kits on ‘soft-skinned’ light vehicles offer insufficient protection against IEDs – especially against mine-triggered IEDs. [4] The South Africans camouflaged their Duiker tankers to look like the standard Biesbok cargo carriers – a trick is worth emulating. Both fuel and water tankers are vulnerable to rifle fire, but  cloaking the exact  nature of  any cargo  is worth doing.