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In Detail —— Strategic Airlift Boeing C-17 and Antonov An-124-100 : a comparison ——

by  Herman A. Kurapov MA MBA

Strategic Airlifters

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Strategic Airlift Capability  –  Procurement  –  February 2006 Strategic Airlifters: a Comprehensive Comparison between the Boeing C-17 and the Antonov An-124-100   [Part 3] Herman A. Kurapov,  Candidate,  Master of Engineering in Logistics, MIT [ NB :  for details on how Herman Kurapov arrived at his costing of An-124-100s,  see:  Average and Median Historic  An-124-100 Acquisition / Purchase Costs.] Summary of  C-17 / An-124-100 Cost Comparison: Using the experience of Britain’s Royal Air Force as a model, we see that a similar 7-year lease of six C-17s for the Canadian Forces would cost at least US $1.725B – or Cdn $2.0B (assuming a 0.8584 exchange rate).  If the An-124-100 were selected instead, this initial $2.0B estimate for CF strategic airlift capability would drop to:    •   $87.0M for the purchase of three (3) An-124-100s    •   $76.5M for the full lease of three (3) An-124-100s    •   $12.7M for the partial lease (based on assured chartering hours). The three An-124-100 options listed correspond to costs that are 25 to 150 times cheaper than the comparable purchase or lease of the C-17. Of course, these are only rough estimates.  There are other expenses  –  such as  training, certification  ( if required ), etc.  –  but,  such  costs  are  too  small  to effect dramatically the main thrust of the comparison. The cost difference between choosing the C-17 and An-124 would be significant to Canadian taxpayers. But this is not the end of the strategic airlifter story. Operational Aspects So far, we have compared direct options without taking into account the various operating concepts / models, which make the An-124-100 even more appealing. Volume of Operations Historically, the Canadian Forces’ strategic airlifts  –  whether procured through commercial chartering or through ‘friendly forces’ – are not required year round. Strategic airlift is required for a maximum of  about a one-month period  at a time. Normally, 250-300 flight hours (to a maximum up to 500 flight hours) of heavy air freighter operations are used per year.  The operations are intense but limited in time  –  which brings up the issue of equipment idleness. Individual An-124-100s have an average operating performance of  roughly 1000 hours per year (to a maximum of 1500 hours).  However, any acquired aircraft will be idle, on average, more than 80% of its potential operating time. In other words, in reality, an An-124-100 will average 300 hours of actual use versus its potential of 1000 hours. Aircraft are most expensive when idle –  they bring value or profit only while in operation. Civil Aircraft versus Military Transports The C-17 is a military plane. [Ed: McDonnell Douglas designed a civil derivative, the BC-17X, years ago but this aircraft has never been sold to any customer.] By definition, the usage of any military aircraft, like the C-17, is very limited. Such aircraft mostly fly their military missions,  sometimes filling governmental roles or relief requests. But a military transport does not have the full operational freedom and flexibility of a civilian aircraft in so far as traffic rights, overflight permits, and licenses are concerned. Thus, by its very nature, a CF C-17 will be restricted in its potential operations other than purely military flights. That is, a CF C-17 would be destined to be idle most of the time  –  without the possibility to utilize it for profit because of its military ownership and regulatory restrictions. The An-124-100, on the other hand, is a civil commercial aircraft (albeit one which evolved from a strategic military airlifter). This civil Antonov was customized and optimized through the demands of more than 10 years of very intense commercial operations. An An-124-100 can do whatever military aircraft can do and more. As such, the An-124-100 has become an integral part of the global air cargo industry, familiar at many of the busiest airports in the world. The military nature of  the C-17 means that this aircraft will stand  idle  for at least 80% of its operating potential. A purely military An-124-100 would be idle just as much. However, the civilian certification of the Antonov presents an opportunity. When not needed by the CF for strategic airlift, an An-124-100 offers tremendous possibilities for substantive ‘cost-recovery’ by the Government of Canada. ‘Idle’ An-124-100s could be operated on a capacity loan basis for  friendly forces and / or for commercial flights.[2] Unlike the hopelessly idle military C-17, a “dual purpose” An-124-100 represents a vast opportunity, selling its immense capacity to the lucrative outsized air cargo transportation market. In other words, a fleet of An-124-100s owned by the government could provide the CF with strategic airlift while, at the same time, also providing a genuine Canadian civil airlift capability. Canadian Civil Air Cargo Industry - Overview A lack of civil airlift capability is one of the biggest problems facing the Canadian air transport industry and Canadian international trade in general. Thus, the civil- certified An-124-100 can meet other vital Canadian national interests besides the long-standing military requirement. Canada’s Peculiarity  –  Lots of Geography,  No Heavy Airlift Capability Canada is the second biggest country in the world, with many locations which can only be reached by air. The country’s economy is very much export/import- oriented and highly dependant on international trade. Located, as it is, between Asia and Europe, Canada is also the natural gateway to the US and Mexico. The ‘blood system’ of  the trade is air transport.  A significant portion of goods manufactured for export are high-value and time-sensitive products  (up to 30% for some markets)  –  these are the staple commodities of  the airfreight business. Canada is dotted with modern airports with state-of-the-art infrastructure. Despite this, Canada lacks the ‘main deck freighter’ capacity [ ie:  aircraft using their main decks for freight, as opposed to underfloor cargo compartments]  to carry all this aircargo (produced or consumed) and no large long-range transport aircraft at all. So, who does fly all  that  airfreight ?  US industry gets most of  the business,  which makes Canada even more dependent on its southern cousin. As a result, the bulk of Canadian-produced  – or consumed –  aircargo goes to/comes from Chicago, New York, Boston or even Los Angeles.  There is a single Air Canada ‘combi’ service [combining passengers and cargo on the aircraft’s main deck] from Toronto only. Civil airlift is a part of  the national transport infrastructure  –  just as are airports, railways, and highway systems.  As such,  civil airlift  needs  federal government support and attention. The benefits of civil airlift (or detriments, if neglected) will have a comprehensive effect on the competitiveness of our national economy. If a fast, reliable transportation system exists, overall competitiveness is increased. Civil airlift is as strategic and important for the national interests as a military one. Possibly even more so.  Fortunately,  miltary and civilian airlift can be combined.