CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
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Counterinsurgency  –  Lessons Learned  –  Strategy  &  Tactics  –  November 2008 General  David  Petraeus:   New  Commander  of  US  CENTCOM Turns his  Attention  to the  Counterinsurgency in  Afghanistan Edited  excerpts  from  an  article  by  the  Defence  Editor  of  The  Times  ( UK )    [1] Respected  US  military  leader  will  now  Oversee  the  Counterinsurgency  in  Afghanistan On  31  October  2008,  General  David  Petraeus ,  the architect  of   ' the  surge '  in  Iraq ,  left  Baghdad  to take  over  as  commander  of  US  Central  Command. The new domain of  the man known affectionately as King David includes the hotspots of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and  Pakistan.  But  perhaps  the  greatest  immediate challenge is  Afghanistan.  Gen Petraeus has become one of  the world's  most committed  and experienced counterinsurgency experts,  especially  since the time of  ' the  surge ' ,  when  30,000  extra  US  troops  were brought into the Iraqi capital and elsewhere to protect the  residents from  Al-Qaeda  and  Sunni  insurgents. ' Lessons  Learned '  in  Iraq  may  help  with  the  incoherent  campaign  in  Afghanistan The  statistics  tell  the  story:  In  Iraq ,  there  are  currently  about  165,000  coalition  troops. In Afghanistan,  there are 65,000,  split between NATO's  International  Security  Assistance Force [ ISAF ] ,  under one commander,  and the 19,000-strong US-led  Combined  Joint  Task Force 101 which oversees security operations in the east under Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF],  commanded by a separate American general.  This is going to change.  Sensibly,  one US  general  will  take command of  both,  but  the operations will still remain separate entities. When he took charge in Baghdad,  Petraeus is believed to have envied his counterpart in Afghanistan. But he will feel differently now, faced with the problem of how to reverse the spiral of  violence in the south and around Kabul.  Above all,  how [ can he help to ]  stop the  never-ending  flow  of  fresh  Taleban  fighters  coming  across  the  border  from  the tribal  regions  of Pakistan.  He will probably spend more time in Islamabad than in Kabul. In Iraq,  the motto of  Gen Petraeus was 'to secure and serve the population'.  Troops  had to live among  the people,  not  stay  hidden  in  fortified  barracks.  He liked to say:  "You can't commute to this fight."  He  wanted  to pursue  enemies  relentlessly,  preventing  them  from enjoying sanctuary anywhere. One successful ploy was  to establish what he called  ' crow's nests '  –  bullet-proof observation posts that were helicoptered on to flat rooftops overnight. He also developed an approach  known  as  the  ' Anaconda  Strategy ' ,  under  which  every possible element of  counterinsurgency  was used in Iraq,  including  political  reconciliation, engagement with Syria  ( through  which  foreign  suicide-bombers  transitted ), anti-terrorist operations,  and  a  profusion  of  intelligence  and  surveillance  missions.  All  these tactics were aimed  at squeezing  the  life  out  of  Al-Qaeda  and  the  Sunni  insurgents.  It  worked. Could the Anaconda approach be replicated in Afghanistan, with Pakistan replacing Syria? The  insurgency  is  smaller  scale  in  Afghanistan,  but  the  Taleban's  malign  influence and power  is  spreading.  General  Petraeus  will  not be in a  position  to  mastermind  day-to-day operations  in  Afghanistan,  as  he  did  so effectively in Baghdad.  However,  if  the  Taleban and  Al-Qaeda  are to be squeezed out,  combat must be combined with a skillful  political and diplomatic campaign  [ with  many of  the elements and approaches which  were used in Iraq.] Foreword   for  the  Army / Marine  Corps  Field  Manual  on  Counterinsurgency     [2] This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the [US] Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations.  For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it must also be informed by contemporary experiences. This manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges. You cannot fight former Saddamists [Baathists] and Islamic extremists [ eg, the Taliban and Al Qaeda ] the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros. The application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each varies considerably. Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today's highly adaptable strains, remain wars [fought] amongst the people. They use variations of standard themes and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual therefore addresses the common characteristics of insurgencies. It strives to provide those [who are] conducting counter- insurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies. A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with non-military agencies [eg, constabulary roles]. The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until recently at our combat training centers. Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help re-establish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long. Performing [these tasks] involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting.  However, the discussions in this manual alert leaders to the challenges of such campaigns and suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible,  adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provides the guidelines needed to succeed in operations that are exceedingly difficult and complex.  Our Soldiers and Marines deserve nothing less. Signed by: David H. Petraeus, Lieutenant General, US Army Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center,  and James F. Amos, Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration.        [1]   Written  by  Michael  Evans,  Defence  Editor  for  The  Times  ( UK ).                Article  first  published  on  06  October  2008.        [2]   Full manual available in  PDF Format  from the Federation of American Scientists.