CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
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Kandahar  City  –  Canadian  Forces  –  US  Troops  –  NATO  ~  ISAF  –  March  2010 Taliban  Influence  in  Kandahar  –  Overview of  Taliban attempts to  Exert  Power  over  the  Population  in  the  Provincial  Capital Excerpts from Summary of a paper written by  Carl Forsberg,  December  2009   [1] Red shows areas with greatest Taliban influence  –  Yellow shows areas of contested control.  The Taliban [ have mounted ]  a  multi - year   campaign   to  exert  control over Kandahar city. [ To  date ] coalition  forces  have not  responded well  to the Taliban in  Kandahar.  This explains why the  International Security Assistance  Force will likely allocate additional  troops to the districts around the  city of  Kandahar  in  2010.  Since  2004,  the  Taliban  [ have kept ] a  clear  and  constant  objective:  to  exert  control  over  Kandahar city.  To accomplish  this objective,  the  Taliban sought  to take control  of  the  populated  areas  surrounding Kandahar city,  district-by-district.  The key districts surrounding Kandahar city are Zhari [2], Panjwayi, Khakrez, Arghandab, and  Dand. In 2004, the Taliban attempted to advance against Kandahar city  from their bases in  Uruzgan,  Zabul  [ east of  Kandahar ], and  Shah Wali Kot. In 2005,  when they were checked  by a battalion of  US forces, the Taliban worked  to extend their lines of  communication westward. [ By securing ] a major  east-west  route into northern Helmand,  [ they sought ]  to  approach  Kandahar  city  from  the  west.  In  2006, the Taliban expanded  their control of  the Zhari and  Panjwayi districts, west of  Kandahar city, but  ISAF prevented the Taliban from using these areas as a base for attacks on Kandahar city. In 2007 and early 2008, the Canadian Forces  focused  on  fighting  the  Taliban for control  of Zhari and  Panjwayi.  This  campaign  ultimately  developed  into a  costly  stalemate, because the Canadians lacked  the troop levels required  to clear the Taliban  from the area decisively. During  2007 and  2008,  while contiuing  to target  the Canadians  in  Zhari and  Panjwayi,  the Taliban organized and conducted  a campaign  to advance on  Kandahar city  from the north. The objective of  this campaign  was the Arghandab district,  located  just  north of  Kandahar city. Arghandab would be an ideal safehaven from which insurgents could project their power into the provincial capital.  Arghandab,  however,  was initially  geographically defensible and politically hostile to the Taliban. The Arghandab district  was  the homeland  of  the Alokozai tribe, over which Mullah Naqib had exercised strong control since the 1980s. Since 2001,  Mullah Naqib  had opposed Taliban rule.  As long as  Naqib's tribal commanders and   their  militias remained  hostile to  the Taliban,  they  posed  a  serious  obstacle  to any advance  through  the  Arghandab  district.   During  spring  and  summer  of  2007,  to prepare for  their attack on Arghandab,  the Taliban  manoeuvred  into  Khakrez district.  Control  of Khakrez  linked several  key Taliban positions  in  western and  northern  Kandahar province. This allowed  resources from each of  these areas  to be moved  into the Arghandab district. In  October  2007, after the natural  death of  Mullah Naqib, the Taliban launched  their initial attack  into Arghandab. This assault marked  the beginning of  an intense campaign  to erode the  resistance of   the population in  Arghandab. The Taliban gained control  of  Arghandab by  using  targeted   violence  to  intimidate  local  leaders. This  was  supplemented  with  the implementation of  a judicial system  to increase the Taliban's legitimacy. By  late  2008,   the  Taliban  had  solidified  their control  of  Arghandab  and  other  key areas surrounding Kandahar city, allowing them to project their influence into the provincial capital. Establishing control over Arghandab and building support networks in the northern, western, and southwestern belts of  Kandahar city dramatically increased the Taliban's ability to wage a campaign of  intimidation and  terror in  Kandahar city  during the rest of  2008 and  2009. The Taliban  have targeted  key provincial government figures, pro-government  mullahs, the Afghan national security forces [ANA and ANP], and  NATO-ISAF personnel.  In addition to attempting to destroy the Afghan government in Kandahar, the Taliban have waged a parallel campaign  to  exert  control  over  the  lives of  Kandahar's  citizens  through  intimidation  and shadow governance structures. Comments  on  Past  Strategies  and  Recommendations  for  ISAF  operations  in  Kandahar During 2008 and 2009, under the command of  General McKiernan, ISAF focused its resources in  Southern Afghanistan on fighting  in Helmand and  border interdiction  in  Spin Boldak and Barham Chah.  Despite  the  importance  of  Kandahar,  ISAF  failed  to prioritize this  province over  Helmand.   ISAF  commanders  also made  poor decisions on where to position its forces within  Kandahar  province  –  including the reluctance to position sufficient troops inside the city. Thus, the Taliban met with minimal resistance as it expanded its control over the city and its suburbs in 2008 and  2009. In the spring of  2009,  General  Stanley McChrystal  arrived  too late  to change  the campaign plans and force allocations for the summer season  made by his predecessor, Gen. McKiernan. As a result,  Helmand remained  the priority for NATO-ISAF.  The battalion of  US forces now fighting  in  Arghandab  is  insufficient  to reverse the Taliban's entrenched  control over  the strategically critical  Arghandab district  in the time available. Largely as a result  of  resource constraints,  ISAF  has been [ accomplishing little more than ] disrupting the Taliban in Kandahar. Simple disruption cannot get ISAF closer to [ its ultimate goal ]  –  the permanent reduction of  Taliban  violence  and  intimidation of  the  local people. To achieve  this  goal,  it  is  necessary  to prevent  the  insurgency  from  having  a  strategic, delegitimizing  effect  on the  Central Government of  Afghanistan. NATO-ISAF's  tasks  in  Kandahar  must  be:  to reverse  the  Taliban's  momentum,  eliminate its  sanctuaries  around  Kandahar  city,  and  neutralize  its  capabilities  to  attack   Kandahar. In  turn,  removing  those  Taliban  sanctuaries necessitates a  properly - resourced  counter- insurgency  campaign  that  is  supported  by  simultaneous  and  mutually  supporting  oper- ations  throughout  Kandahar  province  and  parts of  Helmand. Defeating the Taliban  – or at least neutralizing and selectively destroying it  –  requires more coalition and  Afghan forces deployed  to Kandahar province.  Success depends not only on the number of  troops deployed  but also on  the intelligent application of  counterinsurgency strategy and  a  proper  understanding of  enemy  strategy.           [1]  Paper written by  Carl Forsberg,  the  Institute for the Study of  War,                 ' The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar, ' published  December  2009.           [2]  A  relatively  new  district,  Zhari  is  not  shown  on  the  map  above.                  It  is  adjacent  to Arghandab and  Panjwayi  in the Arghandab valley.