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Medium-Lift Helicopters in Afghanistan  –  CASR Op-Ed  –  February 2011

On Selling Off the Used 'D Model Chinook Helicopters in Afghanistan:
Procurement Contract Details should worry Canadians, not Disposals


Stephen Priestley, CASR Researcher
Update: TF-Afg Air Wing stood down on 18 Aug 2011 but the CF's CH-147D Chinooks have not been sold. This will appear ironic when viewing in hindsight DND's desperate scramble to acquire Chinooks in the first place. (A TF-Afg Air Wing summary also shows that leased Mil helicopters carried more cargo in Afghanistan than all CF rotary-wing aircraft combined.) The fate of the unsold Chinooks is as follows: one damaged CH-147D will return to Canada (where it will presumably become a training aid for CH-147Fs); the other 4 surviving CH-147Ds will be mothballed at the USAF's 309th AMARG (Aerospace Maintenance & Regeneration Group), a storage and disposal facility (formerly AMARC) at  Davis-Monthan AFB  in Tucson, Arizona.

A Canadian Press article by Murray Brewster on the pending sale of the five Canadian Forces CH-147D Chinook medium-lift helicopters in Afghanistan caused a stir. It should but perhaps not for the reasons in the article. First, how did we get from a late start to a sell-off so quickly?

How did we get here?  The inevitable background bit on drawn-out Canadian helicopter buys

Canada has developed a reputation for protracted procurement decisions followed by lengthy delays in achieving operational  status whenever we buy  military  helicopters.  Unfortunately, that tendency to ignore urgency while fussing over details extended even to supplying the CF with used medium-lift helicopters for use in Afghanistan.  Eventually, the Manley Commission forced the issue  –  saying,  in effect,  find helicopters to limit losses or  bring CF troops home.

What followed would appear comic had Canadian soldiers not been dying needlessly on the roads of  Kandahar Province.  The initial move from our Air Force and DND planners was an attempt to queue-jump in the Boeing order book and speed up delivery of brand-new CH-147F Chinooks. That was a non-starter but it wouldn't have mattered – Air Force planners once again proved incapable of resisting the temptation to platinum-plate what was to be an off-the-shelf purchase. As a result, the final Kandahar 'Roto' has gone in and  CH-147Fs announced in 2006 won't appear until 2013-14.

At  the time of  the Manley Commission, Canadian soldiers  bore the brunt of  the fighting  in southern Afghanistan and were taking most of  the casualties. It seemed reasonable to call on our NATO allies to fill the CF transport helicopter gap in Afghanistan. Canada was able to call on the existing pool of NATO-ISAF helicopters but, other than some preferred treatment from the Dutch (ironically using ex-CF Chinooks in some cases) and  Mi-17s provided by the Poles (and gracelessly brushed aside by DND officials), major NATO allies offered no assistance.[1]

Having discounted the CHAPS Chinook rebuild program as an option, MND, Peter MacKay,  tried to negotiate the lease of available US Army CH-47Ds. Predictably, that  too was a non-starter. Then, a year after the Manley Commission report, a deal was announced to purchase six used CH-47D model Chinooks from the US Army. These aircraft (selected by the vendor) weren't exactly sprightly – the oldest was built in 1965 [2] – but these Chinooks were available in-country at the Kandahar Airfield.

That was all two years ago and now the Canadian Forces combat mission in Kandahar is in its final phase. One of the original six CH-147Ds was lost to Taliban ground fire in the summer of 2010. This aircraft was replaced by another US Army 'D model Chinook. This time, a lease was possible. A good deal ? Who knows. As usual,  DND released no details to Canadian citizens.

Standard Mission Profile: Find the Thread; Lose the Thread; then Wander About in Circles

The main point of  that CP article is that the five remaining CH-147Ds are up for sale only "two years after taxpayers shelled out $282 million to buy them." That is true but  it could be argued that this was a modest investment in exchange for the lives of Canadian soldiers saved. There is another issue raised by that quote. The purchase price for the original 6 CH-147Ds has been listed in the media as: $252M, $282M, and  $292M. Why the confusion?  Because, as with that replacement CH-47D lease,  DND never revealed  the actual  purchase price let alone details of any terms to their contract to buy used Chinooks.  That was this article's take-home message.

Unfortunately, current debates on Canadian military procurement seem to quickly wander off topic. In this case, the suggestion was made that the used CH-147Ds should be brought back to Canada where they could "bolster the...hard-pressed search-and-rescue fleet". Any and all available CF aircraft can be pressed into searches but the notion of  backing-up mechanically- troubled CH-149 Cormorants with even more mechanically-complex CH-147s is ludicrous. To make this bad idea worse, just use Chinooks that are 30 years older than the Cormorant fleet.

Asked for comment, the Air Force stated that the CH-147D "would be expensive to keep". No kidding, whereas those 15 new, postwar CH-147Fs will be cheap to maintain? But, then again, who expects useful comments from Air Force public affairs officers?  Rather more revealing is DND itself which,  true to form,  refused to provide any "rationale for ditching" the CH-147Ds.

Leave the CH-147Ds for Someone Who'll Use Them ...  but Give Us Accessible Government

In the current climate, Peter MacKay and his many minions at National Defence Headquarters are probably quite safe from prying eyes.  Sure, at the time of  the sale of  the used Chinooks, it was broadly hinted that those aircraft would be returned to the US Army.  But where is the proof ?  Have you seen the contracts?  Nope, and neither has anyone else outside of  NDHQ or the Cabinet. Ditto for the terms of the leased Chinook replacement or, indeed, the purchase of  15 CH-147Fs and all the miscellaneous contracts needed to support these new helicopters. The selling-off of a handful of  35-year old aircraft suddenly looks like the least of our worries.

A recurring question in all this is why has the Government consistantly allowed DND to hide behind  'Operational Security' and other security nonsenses to avoid releasing information of types routinely available to citizens of other NATO nations? Canadians have repeatedly been promised open, accountable government  by politicians of  all stripes.  With a Federal election in the offing, perhaps it is time that Canadian voters start demanding  true accountability from its government. Once the election is over, it's too late. The existing veil of secrecy serves both ruling politicians and the bureaucracy too well.  And that  is a detail well worth sweating over.


[1] The NATO medium-lift helicopter 'shortage' was discussed ad naseum. In fact the Esercito Italiano had 22-26 CH-47Cs on active service (with 10 more CH-47s in storage for spares). The Spanish and Greeks also had Chinooks in service. They simply weren't willing to help an ally. [ Britain's Defence Secretary claims Italy and Germany have reneged on promised funding for the Multinational Helicopter Initiative (10 additional medium-lift helicopters for NATO-ISAF ).

[2] The helicopter in question was serialed 86-1651 by the US Army but its original serial was 65-8015 –  identifying it as a CH-47A delivered in 1965 and then converted to CH-47D in 1986.

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