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Canadian
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Strategic
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Afghan – Pakistan Border  – CF &  Kandahar PRT  –  July/August 2005 Pakistani Support for Afghan Taliban:  The Role of Islamist Militants in the Pakistani Army and its Intelligence Agency Excerpts of report by Human Rights Watch,  a non-governmental agency In April and May 2001, researchers at Human Rights Watch  (HRW) reported that as many as thirty trucks a day were crossing the Paki- stan-Afghan border. Sources inside Afghan- istan  reported that  some of  these convoys were  carrying  artillery and tank shells,  and rocket-propelled grenades.  Such  deliveries were  in  direct  violation  of  UN  sanctions. At that time,  Pakistan's  army and  intelligence  services,  principally  the  Inter - Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contributed to making the Taliban a highly effective military force. Senior Pakistani military and intelligence officers helped to plan and execute major  military operations.  Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting in  Afghanistan,  Pakistan distinguished  itself,  both  by the sweep of its goals,  and  the scale of  its efforts. Pakistani supporters arranged training for Taliban fighters,  recruited manpower to serve in Taliban armies,  provided diplomatic support in other countries, facilitated shipments of  ammunition  and  fuel,  and  bankrolled  Taliban  military  operations. [Ed:  This article is a brief  historic analysis of  Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban during the civil war.  If  elements within the  Pakistani  Army and  the ISI were willing to help the Taliban take control of Afghanistan at the end of that war, it is  likely  that  they are again  motivated to  help the  Taliban  retake at least the southeastern  regions of  Afghanistan.  Since Canada is about to send personnel – armed  forces  and  civilians –  to the area  around  Kandahar,  it is essential for Canadian citizens to be fully  aware of  what our  forces will be facing.  It appears that there are more than just 'Taliban remnants' striking at the heart of Kandahar.] Religion,  Tribal  Loyalties,  and  the  Lure  of  Trade  with  Central  Asia The western territories of Pakistan are hilly areas,  geologically  contiguous  with the areas of Afghanistan  just across the border.  In addition,  the ethnic identity of  the population  in these territories  is  identical  to  that  of  the  Afghan  tribes (Pashtun)  in  and  around  Kandahar. On  Pakistan's  eastern  border,  India  is  seen  as  a  powerful,  hostile  neighbour. The  Pakistani  Army  and  the  ISI  sought  to  give  Pakistan  'strategic  depth'  by setting up a  secure  Afghan  frontier  on  Pakistan's  western  border.  This  would permit  the  concentration  of  Pakistani  forces  in  the  east,  in  coveted  Kashmir. In addition, Pakistan could realize economic advantages through stronger political and  economic  links  to  Central  Asia  via  Afghanistan. According to well-known journalist,  Ahmed Rashid,  General Naseerullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto's interior minister, created  the  Afghan  Trade  Development  Cell within  his  ministry,  ostensibly  to  promote  trade  routes  to  Central  Asia.  But this  agency  was  also  used  to  funnel  financial  support  to  the  Taliban. The Role of  the Private Pakistani Trucking Cartels  in Supporting the Taliban When the Taliban carried out its first major military operation in late 1994, it secured the support of Pakistan's trucking cartels based in the towns of Quetta and Chaman, just over the Afghanistan border. The traders  – predominantly Pashtuns and drawn from many of the same tribes as the Taliban  –  saw the Taliban as a way to secure trade routes which had previously been dominated by predatory Afghan warlords.  Duties imposed on trucks transiting Afghanistan from Pakistan would become the Taliban's most important official source of income. The Pakistani truckers also contributed to the  madrassas  in  Pakistan  where the Taliban were trained,  thus linking the trucking cartels to the political parties that run the madrassas.  Truckers also make contributions to officials in the local and provincial administrations in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. The Evidence of Direct Pakistani Military Support for the Taliban in Combat Pakistani aircraft reportedly assisted with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat operations in late 2000.  Several senior members of  Pakistan's  ISI agency and the Pakistani army were reportedly involved in planning major Taliban military operations. For example,  the Taliban assault on Taloqan,  in September 2000,  was uncharacteristic of  known Taliban capabilities.  Unusual  features of  this  assault were the length of  the preparatory artillery fire,  the fact that much of  the fighting took  place at night,  a  new-found  willingness  by the Taliban  to sustain  heavy casualties,  and  the  disciplined  halting  of  the offensive after the city fell. This would not be the first time that the Taliban suddenly showed atypical military prowess and innovation. On several occasions between 1995 and 1999,  the Taliban's  military  skills  improved abruptly on the eve of particularly pivotal battles, and, in one case, declined just as abruptly after a credible  threat of  intervention  was  made  by an outside power. For example, during the offensives against Herat in 1995,  and Kabul in 1996,  Taliban fighters suffered heavy losses at the hands of veteran Afghan government forces. Repeatedly, initial defeats were followed by a period of quiet. Then Taliban troops mounted new attacks, displaying capabilities that had been conspicuously lacking before. At Herat, in 1995,  government troops defeated 6,000 Taliban fighters after they ran short of ammunition and other logistical support. The rout was such that some analysts predicted that the Taliban phenomenon had run its course. Instead, the Taliban  forces  were  retrained and refitted.  Their retreat from Herat in the face of a powerful offensive by government troops  was  suddenly  halted.  The  Taliban counter-attacked,  ambushing  government spearhead  forces,  while mobile units in 4x4 pickup  trucks  out-flanked  the  government army  and  cut  off  the  roads  connecting  it with  its  rear - area  supply  depots. The retreating government units tried and failed to establish a defensive line as Taliban units in pickup trucks – many armed with anti-aircraft cannon and rocket launchers –  repeatedly outflanked the new positions and attacked from the rear, leaving the paved roads at will and driving their 4x4 vehicles across open ground and rugged, hilly terrain. The pickups, whose delivery was facilitated by Pakistan, introduced a kind of mobile warfare not seen in the local Afghan fighting before. Similarly, after Taliban offensives aimed at Kabul failed in the autumn of 1995  –  with significant losses of men and equipment – a period of quiet ensued. Taliban troops then renewed  their  attacks  and  displayed  a  notable  increase in  technical  capability.  The Taliban  first  took  Jalalabad and then struck north toward Sarobi, a district capital east of Kabul. This was a linchpin of the government defensive system  around  the  national  capital.  Again,  the  Taliban troops  suddenly  displayed  a  flair  for  speed  and  flank attacks.  The  retreating  government  troops  were caught off-guard  by  the  agility  of  the  attacks  and  the Taliban's ability to cross rough ground in their Pakistani 4x4 pickup trucks,  attacking on the government's flanks. Such speed of operations and technical proficiency are very uncharacteristic of mujahidin forces generally. The normal pattern of mujahidin warfare was hit-and- run raiding and low-level skirmishing. At Spin Boldak and subsequently at Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban forces displayed excellent command-and- control capabilities,  reacted  quickly  to changes in  battlefield  fortunes, and, in particular, used a degree of mobility and manoeuvrability that are more character- istic of a professional army – specifically,  that of  regular army officers and non- commissioned  officers  trained and experienced in the practice of mobile warfare. Most telling was the sudden faltering of Taliban forces advancing eastward from Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998. Nine Iranians – eight diplomats and one reporter – had just been  killed at the  Iranian consulate,  provoking a major crisis with  Iran. The Iranian government blamed Pakistan explicitly for this incident  (Pakistan had given assurances for the diplomats' safety) and threatened military intervention.  A substantial Iranian military force  (ultimately close to 250,000 men)  was massing on the Afghan/Iranian border.  As part of an effort by Pakistan to prevent the crisis from getting out of control, Pakistani  military  advisers  to  the  Taliban  were withdrawn. The  result,  according  to  most  western  military  observers, was a  sudden  decline  in  Taliban  military  effectiveness. Pakistani Recruitment and the Training of Islamist Volunteers from Pakistan Following the Taliban's capture of Kabul in September 1996, the first direct military contacts between the ISI's  Afghan Bureau and the Taliban were established with the dispatch of a small team of  Pakistani military advisers to Rishikor,  the former Afghan Army base southwest of Kabul. The garrison at Rishikor, like a number of long-established military  training  camps,  had  fallen  into  Taliban  hands and  was  now  turned  over  to  the  control  of  Pakistani political  parties eager  to  become  active  in  Afghanistan. This policy had a  number of advantages  for  the  Taliban. Most importantly, these camps provided the Taliban with a supply of self-financing,  self-supporting  fighting units. However,  these units were also difficult for the Taliban to control.  Commanders were appointed by the Pakistani party leadership rather than by the Taliban and they were prone to following their own  judgements.  In  an  interview  with  HRW, a retired senior Pakistani military officer  claimed that up to 30 percent of  Taliban fighting strength is made up of Pakistanis serving in units organized by Pakistani political parties.  According  to  another  source,  8,000  to  15,000  Taliban  troops are  foreigners,  principally  Arabs  from  the  Gulf  states  and  North  Africa. The garrison at Rishikor was mentioned frequently during Human Rights Watch's research in the region.  A  'United Front'  official  described  it as the main training center for Pakistani  volunteers  brought  to Afghanistan  to  fight  for the Taliban. Several Pakistani volunteer fighters,  captured  by the  United Front between 1996 and 1999, consented to be interviewed by  HRW while in United Front custody in June 1999. These captives also described receiving training at Rishikor. They said that,  as late as 1999,  a special  compound  existed  at Rishikor  for the  training of Pakistani volunteers for the Taliban, and that a guarded area within the camp held the living quarters for Pakistani military and intelligence personnel. The camp was large and very active, with twenty to thirty trainers, of whom four or five were Arabs and the balance Pakistani. Recruits went through eight or nine classes a day, with up to 150 students per class. They estimated the total number of students in the facility to exceed 1,000 men at any given time.  The language of instruction was Pashtu, and subjects covered included physical training, weapons maintenance, weapons training – including on Kalashnikov automatic rifles, RPK light machine guns, 23mm ZU anti-aircraft cannon, 82mm and 120mm mortars, and rockets [Ed: likely Chinese 107mm and Russian 122mm] – and religious instruction. Selected recruits would be sent for further training at specialized  camps  for  armoured  vehicle crews, and  for  commando  training  (at  Kandahar).  The bulk  of  the  recruits  would  be  sent  to  frontline areas.  Volunteers  were  not  obligated  to  fight following their training, but they were encouraged to do so as part of  their Islamic duty.  In combat, the  volunteers  were  organized  into  groups  of twenty  to thirty  men,  each led  by an older man. The Taliban volunteer fighters  interviewed by  Human Rights Watch  described their Pakistani trainers as being in their forties, military in appearance and speech, and frequently multi-lingual, speaking English, in addition to Pashtu and in many cases Arabic and/or Urdu.  Leaders of the fighting groups were younger, usually in their thirties,  who identified  themselves as  former  Pakistani military.  In some instances,  self-described  former  Pakistani  military  officers  provided  specialized forms  of  assistance,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  maintenance  and  use  of artillery.  One  ex-Taliban  fighter  described  meeting  a  former  Pakistani  artillery colonel  who  claimed  to  have  volunteered  to  work  with  the  Taliban  artillery forces  in  order  to  increase  their  efficiency  and  effectiveness. Recruitment  of  volunteer  fighters  was  organized  by  several  Pakistani  political parties  that  use  their  madrassas  as  recruiting  centres.  Boys  under  eighteen are  among  the  recruits.  These  parties  organize  speaking  tours  by  veteran fighters. Veterans  visit  both  rural  and  urban  mosques,  seeking  to  persuade listeners  of  their  holy  duty  to  fight  against  the  United  Front  in  Afghanistan. One of  the best known of  the  Islamist  parties  involved in the recruiting of  young  jihadis is the Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam (JUI),  a religious  party  that  has  operated  madrassas  and  provided various  social  services  in  Baluchistan  and  in  the  Northwest Frontier  Province.  The  JUI  was  among  the earliest patrons of the Taliban. Maulana Fazlur Rahman (right), JUI Party head, was made chairman of the  National Assembly's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1994, during the Bhutto government.  He used this position to lobby on  behalf of the  Taliban,  both within Pakistan,  and in the Middle East. It should be  emphasized  that  this  recruitment  is  performed  openly  and  even aggressively,  and that  Pakistani  government  officials  have repeatedly admitted knowledge of  the  paramilitary  activities of the  religious  schools and some have officially  expressed  discomfort  regarding  them.  Indeed,  recruits regularly cross into  Afghanistan  in  trucks,  on  their  way  to  fight  against  the  United  Front, and  meet  no  interference  from  Pakistani  border  guards  even  on  main  roads. Private  Pakistani  Involvement  in  Arms  Procurement  for  Afghanistan Aid to the Taliban has made Pakistani individuals and companies rich.  A number of  Pakistani  firms carved out lucrative niches, purchasing munitions and spare parts abroad, then smuggling them into Afghanistan for  resale  to  the  Taliban.  Private  companies  buy from Chinese arms manufacturers through dealers in Hong Kong, or through arms dealers based in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. Pakistan-based  companies  maintain  'buying teams'  in Hong Kong  and  Dubai. In Hong Kong,  members of these teams search for new technologies, weapons, and sources of ammunition and spare parts that will fit with Taliban needs. Often, Chinese companies manufacturing arms and munitions will approach these teams themselves,  trying  to  interest  them  in  various  items.  Arms purchased in this manner appear to move primarily by ship. Sealed containers are brought into the port of Karachi, and are then moved by truck to Afghanistan without inspection.