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January 2003
Can DND use its new budget to re-invent the Forces?
Dianne DeMille — CASR Editor
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Finance Minister John Manley have announced that there will be more
money for the Department of National Defence (DND) in the upcoming February 2003 budget. Canada has been under
great pressure to increase its defence spending from its military allies, especially the United States. In
addition, several domestic voices have recently claimed that increased spending on the Canadian Forces has now
become a matter of extreme urgency.
No one knows just how much money will be allocated for National Defence — health care seems to be the top
priority in the current cabinet — but we can assume that the amount will be significant. Key questions arise:
How best to spend this money? How can new resources be deployed most effectively? What shape should the
Canadian Forces take in this changed world?
The Mandate of National Defence
The most recent wording of the Canadian Forces' mandate is given in the 1994 Defence White Paper. The two top
tasks are:
1) Defence of Canadian Territory
2) Co-operation with the United States in the defence of North America
These two goals are always listed as if they were separate tasks, but in fact the two are inseparable. Neither
Canada nor the US can defend its own homeland without preparing for the defence of the entire continent. Thus,
in a practical sense, the primary mandate of the Canadian Forces is to work closely with the armed forces of
the United States to mount a defence of the continent. At the same time, Canada must maintain an acceptable
degree of autonomy as befits a sovereign nation. It is a difficult tightrope to walk.
Canada-US Joint Planning Group instituted in 2001
The practical imperative to co-operate with US armed forces, coupled with the widespread political anxiety over
surrendering Canadian sovereignty, were both exemplified in the recent formation of the Joint
Planning Group under the leadership of Canadian Lt Gen Ken Pennie (Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD).
Apparently, the Joint Planning Group was seen as a kind of compromise, avoiding two other undesirable outcomes
— Canadian Forces being assigned to the US Northern Command or NORAD (a joint US/Canadian command) being
expanded to include land forces and, more importantly, maritime surveillance capability.
The fact of the matter is that the Canadian Department of National Defence wants to work closely with the US
Department of Defence, and takes seriously any recommendations that DoD makes to the Canadian Forces. For
example, it is instructive to examine what the US wants Canada to bring along to help out with an attack on
Iraq.
Which military assets does the US want Canada to bring to a War on Iraq?
The US has prepared a list of the Canadian military assets that it considers most valuable in its upcoming war
on Iraq. It might be useful to look closely at this list: What are the attributes that make these assets
desirable? Can we build on those attributes? Which of these assets would be useful for our own primary task
— continental defence?
This is the 'wish list' that the Bush administration sent to Canada:
1) JTF2 — Joint Task Force Two, the special forces used in Afghanistan
2) Coyote — a highly effective wheeled reconnaissance
vehicle
3) Hercules — a transport aircraft (capable of
patrol and in-flight refueling)
4) Aurora — long-range maritime patrol and
surveillance aircraft
5) Frigates — mid-sized vessels already deployed in the Arabian Sea
What lessons can we take from these US preferences?
The United States military is a heavily armed, technologically advanced force. When the US asks allies for
contributions towards a coming war, it analyzes the strengths of each ally and identifies what it can usefully
bring to the forging of a coalition. Canada is a rich country which spends very little (as a percentage of its
GDP) on its military. It is pertinent that the US wants our specialized equipment and special forces, not
regular personnel. Canada does not have a large standing army. Other US allies do (especially since the
recent expansion of the Atlantic Alliance).
Certainly Canada can provide special forces for any action against Iraq, but there is a deeper lesson to be
drawn from US preferences. We can provide not just special forces but, perhaps more importantly, specialists
— well-educated, highly trained technicians who can carry out the tasks of reconnaissance, intelligence
gathering, and threat analysis.
The take-home lesson is that a country like Canada, with strong economic resources but a small population,
should strive for quality rather than quantity, not only in its military personnel but in its equipment as
well.
Development of a Niche Force
The US has made requests of Australia similar to those made of Canada — special forces (SASR),
reconnaissance aircraft, and RAN naval vessels already deployed in the Arabian Sea. These assets are useful,
specialized adjuncts to the massive armed forces of the United States. Since 11 September 2001, Australia has
embraced the idea of becoming a 'niche force', prepared to work within larger coalitions. It makes sense
militarily and economically.
The Coyote recon vehicle — an excellent example of niche capabilities
The Coyote carries an extremely sophisticated suite of sensors which can effectively monitor the
movement of opposing forces on the battlefield, during daylight or at night. The Coyote proved itself in
Afghanistan and is obviously desirable to the US. This is evidence of the advantages to be gained if Canada's
military can shape itself into a 'niche force'.
But how could an armoured reconnaissance vehicle be useful for continental defence? What makes the Coyote
the best in its class isn't the vehicle itself but its equipment — or rather the particular combination of
different sensing technologies and the onboard integration of incoming data and images. Such technology can be
adapted for any reconnaissance or surveillance task. More importantly, the skilled operators of these sensors
can perform their mission regardless of whether the reconnaissance 'platform' is ground-based, aerial, or
maritime (the latter being particularly emphasized in the formation of the new Canada/US 'Joint Planning Group').
There is one feature of the Coyote that may make the vehicle itself useful for continental defence — it is fully
protected against nuclear, biological, and chemical agents. Were an area to be contaminated by terrorist attack,
the Coyote's crew could operate its sophisticated sensors from within the safety of the sealed vehicle.
Once this reconnaissance team had surveyed the area for unseen dangers, suited personnel could be sent in to do
clean-up.
Highly-trained personnel to operate high-end equipment
Canadian taxpayers at present seem willing to spend more on the Canadian Forces, but they want to see that
their money is spent effectively. A niche force would require recruiting, training, and constantly upgrading
the skills of some of the brightest young men and women in the country. The expense per individual would
increase, but this would be a far smarter investment than buying new strategic airlifters. Those are the kinds
of shifts in resource allocation that the Canadian taxpayer is looking for from DND, especially if the department gets the
budget increase that everyone is predicting.
The US Forces have seen what Canadians can do, and they've given us a list of what we should bring with us to
Baghdad. DND should examine that list and extrapolate. Future spending should build on the specialized skills
and capabilities we already have.
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