CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
Review

Defense Strategy  –  Counterinsurgency  –  Southern Afghanistan  –  August  2008 Counterinsurgency  –  Count  on  it :   Future  Forces  Require Agile,  Manoeuvre  Warfare  against  Non-State  Combatants Edited excerpts from the Defense Strategy paper by US Secretary Robert Gates  [1] Introduction  :  The  New  Strategic  Environment  facing  the  US  Department  of  Defense Over the next twenty years, physical pressures such as population growth, rivalry over resources, a  race for  energy  reserves,  chaotic  climate  change,  and continuing environmental degradation  [ will  likely ] combine  with  social,  cultural,  geo - political,  and technological  changes,  to create a  growing  sense of  uncertainty.  It will be exacerbated  by the speed and scale of these changes,  and  the unpredictable and complex interactions between and among these world - wide currents.  Globalization  and  economic interdependence,  while creating new opportunities, have also created a web of vulnerabilities, and have spread  the  risk [ of  conflict to far - flung  regions ]. Violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda ( and their associates ) comprise a complex and urgent challenge.  Like communism and  fascism before it,  today's  violent extremist  ideology rejects  the rules and structures of  the  international  system.  They  reject  state  sovereignty, and  attempt  to negate  self - determination  and  human  dignity  wherever  they  gain  power. Combating  Violent  Extremist  Non-State  Groups  will  require  Innovative  Techniques For the foreseeable future, the strategic environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. These are long - term challenges.  Success in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and international power over years or decades to come. US dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non- state actors ( and their state sponsors ) ,  strong  motivation  to  adopt  asymmetric  methods to counter our advantages.  For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat. These modes of warfare may appear individually or in combination, spanning the spectrum of warfare and intertwining hard and soft power.  In  some  instances,  we  [ have  not  realized ]  that a conflict is underway until it was well advanced and our options limited.  In future,  we must develop better intelligence capabilities to detect,  recognize,  and analyze  new forms of warfare.  As well,  we must explore joint approaches and strategies to counter them. Defense Planning and Procurement must respond to this Complex Strategic Environment Increasingly, the US Department of Defense (DoD) will have to plan for a future security environment shaped by the interaction of powerful strategic trends. These trends suggest a range of plausible futures, some presenting major challenges and security risks. DoD should act to reduce risks by shaping the development of  trends through the decisions that  we  make  now  -  the equipment  that we acquire,  the capabilities  that we develop,  the security cooperation  that we seek,  and, above all,  the operational activities  that we pursue. The Department should develop the military capability  (and the capacity to hedge against uncertainty),  along with the institutional agility and flexibility to plan early, and respond effectively, alongside interdepartmental, non-governmental, and international partners. The  US  Deparment  of  Defense  must  win  the  ' Long  War '  against  Violent  Extremists For the foreseeable future, winning the Long War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of the US. We must defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society. We must also foster an environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all those who support them. In concert with others, we seek to reduce support for violent extremism and encourage moderate voices,  offering a  positive alternative to the extremists' vision for the future. Victory requires us to apply all elements of national power in partnership with old allies and new partners.  Iraq and Afghanistan remain the central fronts in the struggle, but we cannot lose  sight  of  the  implications  of  fighting  a  long-term,  episodic,  multi-front,  and  multi- dimensional  conflict  more  complex  than  the  Cold  War  confrontation  with  communism. Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is crucial to winning this conflict, but it alone will not bring victory.  We face a clash of arms,  a war of ideas,  and an assistance  effort  that  will  require patience  and  innovation.  In  concert  with  our  partners,  we  must  maintain  a  long - term commitment  to  undermining  and  reducing  the  sources  of  support  for  extremist  groups by  countering  the  totalitarian,  ideological  messages  [ that  they  use  for  recruiting ]. Although driven by this transnational ideology,  our adversaries themselves are a collection of  regional  and  localized  extremist  groups.  Local  grievances  help  fuel  their  conflicts. They  thrive  in  ungoverned,  under-governed,  and  mis - governed  areas.  These conflicts will  [ coalesce  into   a  series  of ]  prolonged  campaigns,  violent  struggles  for  legitimacy and  influence over  the  local  population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development,  as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of  insurgencies.  For  these  reasons,  arguably  the  most  important  military component of  the  struggle against violent extremists  is  not  the fighting  we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves. Victory will include discrediting extremist ideology, creating fissures between and among extremist groups, and ultimately reducing them to the level of nuisance groups that can be tracked and handled by law enforcement capabilities. The US Department  of  Defense must  Strengthen and  Expand Alliances and Partnerships The  capacities  of  our  partners  vary  across  mission  areas.  We  will  be  able  to  rely  on many  partners  for  certain  low - risk  missions,  such  as  peace - keeping  and  humanitarian assistance.  More  complex  counter - insurgency  and  high - end  operations  are  likely  to draw  on  fewer  partners  with  the  capability  to  act  in  support  of  mutual  goals. We  will  support,  train,  advise,  and  equip  partner  security  forces to counter  insurgencies, terrorism,  and  other  threats.  We  will  assist  other  countries  in  improving  their capabilities through  security  cooperation,  just  as  we  will  learn  valuable  skills  and  information  from others  better  situated  to  understand  some  of  the  complex  challenges  we  face  together. We must also work with long - standing friends and allies  to transform  their  capabilities. Key to transformation is training, education and, where appropriate, the transfer of defense articles to build partner capacity.  We  must  work  to develop  new ways of  operating  across the full spectrum of warfare.  Our partnerships must be capable of  applying  military and  non-military power when and where needed  –  a prerequisite against an  adaptable,  transnational  enemy.         [1]    The  original   National  Defense  Strategy   paper  is  available  in  PDF  format.