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Afghanistan  Air  Wing  –  Tactical  Helicopters  –  Counterinsurgency  –  February  2009 Afghanistan  Air  Wing:  New  Air  Assets  could  make  the  Canadian Forces Far  More  Effective  in  the  Counterinsurgency  in  RC–South Edited  excerpts  from  an  article  published  in  the  Small  Wars  Journal    [1] CF  ISR  assets may  prove useful  considering  changes to the strategy  of  the US  military [ Ed: The article excerpted and edited below was written about one year ago. The author was commenting on the surge of  forces in Iraq. The central focus of his article is the marked shift in traditional counterinsurgency doctrine under General David Petraeus  –  a top tactician and strategist who is also an expert in counterinsurgency. Gen Petraeus, according to this author, realized the importance of  airborne  ISR  assets to the effectiveness of  soldiers and Marines. Now  that  Canada  has an  'Air  Wing'  stationed at  Kandahar  Air  Field,  perhaps we might consider how the CF can be more effective at counterinsurgency in RC-South. Canada might also coordinate the activities of our air and ground forces with those of  the  United States in the coming months.  If  our  Forces  show  some degree of  success at containing the Taliban insurgents, Parliament might debate whether the CF should stay on in Kandahar  –  especially if  none of  our  NATO allies are  willing  to  deploy  combat  troops  to Afghan border areas. ] Counterinsurgency  Strategy  and  Tactics  –  Lessons  Learned  From  Vietnam  to  Iraq Counterinsurgencies are not won by US armed forces  –  ground or air.  They are won by indigenous governments.  Our goal must be to increase the strength and legitimacy of the indigenous regime. Anything we do that reduces the power of the government to develop legitimate and stable institutions moves us further from victory. The  most  serious  threat  we  face  is  strategic  –  not  tactical.  Insurgents  generally  win by  wearing  down the political  will to fight over a  prolonged  period  –  not  by  defeating armies  in  the  field.   Nevertheless,  one  of  the  best  ways  for  an  occupying  power  to contribute  to  stability  in  the  region  is  by  suppressing  insurgent  forces  –  to  weaken and  deter  disruptive  activity  long  enough  for  an  indigenous  army  to get  on  its  feet. In  addition,  large  expeditionary  armies  are  expensive  and  hard  to  maintain.  As  a  rule, the larger  the army,  the shorter  the period  the United States  can  maintain  it  in  the  field. In other words, increasing the size of the force used in a counterinsurgency operation has a tendency to decrease the amount of time that Congress will be willing to dedicate to the war. In the Vietnam War,  the US erred on the side of  a large ground force. The local population saw the foreigners as invaders and  the United States  could not kill, or suppress, insurgents fast enough to overcome enemy recruiting.  The American population tired of the war before the insurgents did  –  and  the  United  States  withdrew  its  army. The  usual  answer  to  this  problem  is  to  make  the  Ground  Forces  more  effective  and less  obtrusive.  [ This is central  to the ]  classical  COIN  techniques  as  described  in  the  ' Small  Wars  Manual ' and  FM 3-24  –  [ the manual co-authored by  Gen David Petraeus ]. COIN  strategy  stressed  ' Boots on the Ground '  –  Airpower  was  ' Counterproductive ' When General David Petraeus took command in Iraq,  the counterinsurgency doctrine he presented reflected these historical experiences. COIN doctrine, as a whole, says nothing about airpower  –  then something changed.  After a short time in Iraq,  Petraeus  began  to increase  air  strikes,  a  sea  change  in  COIN  doctrine.  Why  did  General  Petraeus  defy doctrine?  Because  air  and  space  technology  have  come  a  long  way  since  Vietnam. New communication technology  allows air and ground forces  to work together  much more effectively than in the past. The synergy that joint forces derive from this interaction vastly magnifies the power of  the force.  The situational  awareness of  both  soldiers and  Marines increases dramatically when married to airborne ISR.  The effect of this increased air-ground synergy has been to make the surge [ in Iraq ] more effective than the twenty percent (20%) increase  in  ground  forces  would  have  suggested. Airborne  ISR  Increases  the  Ability  of  Joint  Forces  to  Suppress  Insurgent  Activity Although the media  generally  portrayed  the surge as entirely  about an increase  in ground forces,  this  characterization  misses the bigger picture.  One of  the  most  important  factors contributing  to  the  success  of  the  surge  in  Iraq  has  been  the  integration  of  airborne assets  into  joint  operations.  The  ability  of  ground  troops  to  call  on  airborne  ISR  has increased  their  ability  to  find  and  track  insurgents.  This  has  had  the  effect  of  making US  forces  less  conspicuous  and  more  precise  in  their  ability  to  engage  insurgents. ISR  assets  have  increased  the  ability  of  joint  forces  to  follow  insurgents  back  to  their safe  houses  –   to  confront  them  at  a  time  and  place  of  our  choosing  rather  than theirs. Instead  of  engaging  them  in  populated  city  streets,  we  can  use  our  'eyes  in  the  sky' to  follow  them  out  to  less  populated  areas  and  ' take  the  fight  to  them '. [1]  By  Richard  Andres,  first  published  19  January  2008  in  the  Small  Wars  Journal.        Professor  Andres  is  a  ' Special  Advisor '   to  the  Secretary  of   the  US  Air  Force.