|
Canada-US Defence Cooperation – November 2002
The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability:
The Issues (excerpts)
Part 1 — Interoperability: The Way Ahead for Canadian-American Practice
Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs —
Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University
In the Wake of September 11
[The] immediate impacts [of September 11] in the Canadian context has been to intensify the drive to
interoperability as a matter of principle, [and] to broaden its implications to include a potential integration
of command and control arrangements [with our allies] across the board and at the highest levels.
The 9/11 assault may also have creat[ed] a climate of receptivity within Canada for the further enhancement of
interoperability arrangements. This may be true even if such arrangements come to imply an additional loss of
autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre in relation to potential Canadian force deployments. In any case, it is now
worth emphasizing again that one of the main pillars of [the DND paper] Strategy for 2020 is the
emphasis it gives to reinforcing Canada’s special relationship with its principal allies, most notably the
United States. ...
[Interoperability] is listed as one of the defence establishment’s eight long-term strategic objectives.
The goal is to “Strengthen our military-to- military relationships with our principal allies ensuring
interoperable forces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).”
Three targets are identified as prerequisites for achieving this end:
1) Manage our interoperability relationship with the US and other allies to permit seamless operational
integration on short notice
2) Develop a comprehensive program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible with our principal allies
3) Expand the joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with the US
More DND documents Confirm Priority of Interoperability
Strategy for 2020 was soon followed by other [directives] that were clearly designed to put flesh on the
bones, to give the high-blown phrases practical definition. These publications provide ample evidence that the
department has fully embraced interoperability as a critical objective for the immediate future. What is
particularly notable ... is the degree to which ... the concept of interoperability is now seamlessly,
consistently and centrally woven into both the thinking and the fabric of the defence establishment.
Absent a dramatic change in the receptivity of the external environment (that is, the United States), or an
unexpected contrary intervention on the part of the political leadership, this tight interconnection of defence
planning documents should help to ensure that the various capability enhancements identified for the CF will
have the full weight of the Department behind them.
Acting with Allies
Given that the Canadian Forces lack the capacity to achieve their mission objectives by themselves when
deployed abroad, yet another key DND document, Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces
(SCP), also assumes that Canada will have to act with its major allies.
“The fundamental asset that the CF requires for international operations ... is what may be termed a
tactically self-sufficient unit (TSSU). It follows that TSSUs must be capable of integrating into a Combined
Force package as a ‘task-tailored’ component. The consequence of [this] requirement ... is that TSSUs
must be modular and adaptable, capable of integrating with other international and national forces that are
likely to be involved in a joint and combined operation.”
|
The most likely coalition leader for CF TSSUs is the US, which leads to the emphasis placed on interoperability
with US forces by CF leaders. A corollary of the coalition nature of Canadian military operations is that
decisions regarding commitments of Canadian TSSUs are vitally important, highlighting the importance of
military strategic level command capability in the CF. In addition, however, and with commendable candour for
an in-house planning publication, the SCP also offers a warning about the possibly adverse political
consequences of the growing emphasis on greater Canada-US military interoperability.
Can Canada live with the Consequences?
This trend raises concerns over the degree to which CF units and Canadian political authorities can retain the
ability to make autonomous decisions in future fast-paced combat situations. The trend toward integrated
operations and interoperability may create an unintended interdependency if CF units become too enmeshed in
Alliance controlled network systems that require automatic linkages of sensor and weapon systems for effective
tactical operation.
One way in which this could occur would be through the Canadian Navy’s ability to ‘plug in’ to a USN
‘net-centric’ battle group via the evolving US concept of ‘co-operative engagement capability.’
Employing dedicated data links, ships and aircraft can share secure data gathered from a variety of different
sensors to gain a single, composite battlespace management picture. This can then be used by a central command
authority to command, fire and control the weapons of a subordinate, third-party unit to attack a target never
seen by the firing entity.
But as one Canadian officer has warned, there may be a high political price to be paid for such a far-reaching
interoperability arrangement: Integration into a carrier battle group operating like this implies a level of
commitment to force goals and therefore to the political objectives that underlie them. There will be no time
to check national rules of engagement and ‘opt out’ on a case-by-case basis or refer difficult
decisions to national headquarters. Buy-in on operational decisions will be absolute and the consequences
shared accordingly. Today, the USS Vincennes must take the full blame for misidentifying and engaging an
Iranian [Airbus] — tomorrow she could do it again, but with a missile fired from a Canadian ship.
The Evidence of New Hardware
There is one final, but centrally significant, indicator of the commitment of both the DND and the uniformed
establishment to the implementation of the interoperability doctrine. Interoperability is partly about the
sharing of operational practices. It is also about hardware. The equipment procurement programs currently
planned for the CF thus help to tell the tale.
[F]rom the vantage point of even the most well informed analyst, the list of new additions and improvements
that have interoperability as their primary justification is bound to look impressive. The package as a whole
is an unambiguous demonstration that Canadian defence planners have been moving towards greater
interoperability with the United States in a manner that is far more comprehensive and rapidly paced than most
Canadians realize.
The best single account of these accumulating procurement projects, at least in the public domain, has been
compiled by Sharon Hobson of Jane’s International Defense Review. In a recent article, Hobson
quotes Brigadier- General Marc Dumais, Chief of Staff for the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, on the challenge
that now confronts Canadian defence planners in deciding where to invest the DND’s limited capital funds.
Dumais observes that the United States is “at the leading edge of many developments, and from a budgetary
perspective, it’s evident that we can’t keep up in all areas, so we have to be very careful as to
which areas we ensure that we keep up in, and get the most bang for our buck in terms of focusing future
interoperability requirements”.
To a large extent, this is a reflection of the ‘catch-up’ problem facing Canada as it strives to
strengthen its defence relationship with the United States at a time when the much-discussed ‘Revolution
in Military Affairs’ (RMA) is threatening to leave behind all but the biggest of the defence spenders in
the Western alliance. As the DND’s Report on Plans and Priorities, 2001-2002 notes, “the US is
leading the RMA, and thus, by remaining interoperable with US forces, Canada will remain interoperable with any
major, future coalition force led by the US”.
Ultimately, according to General Dumais again, “it comes down to resources, and leveraging our
partnerships and getting the most out of collective defence. Because clearly we wouldn’t be able to afford
providing our own defence for our sovereignty, for example, or something of that nature”.
If ‘going it alone’ is not, then, a viable option for the CF, where exactly is the DND placing its
interoperability bets?
This will require, among other things, the completion of the Omnibus Canadian Military Satellite Communications
(CANMILSATCOM) Project already underway, at a budgeted cost of $480 million. Under this project, the DND will
participate in the US Advanced EHF satellite system, which is scheduled to be operational in 2006. At present
the CF have no dedicated long-range communications system of their own, and must rely instead on commercial
satellite services. They can only operate with American forces, however, if they have a capability in, and
guaranteed access to, the type of system upon which the Americans themselves rely. The CF will also continue to
co-operate with the United States through the Canada-US Space Co-operation Working Group on initiatives like
the Joint Space Project.
On land, the Report on Plans and Priorities 2001-2002 notes that the Canadian Army will “work to
develop and integrate interoperability benchmarks into the design and implementation of the ‘Army of
Tomorrow’.” The army is currently re-structuring itself to become a lighter and, therefore, more
mobile force by acquiring 651 General Motors LAV III armoured personnel carriers. But army planners hasten to
add that becoming a “medium-weight force does not equate to a niche force”.
The army’s planning concept is to “structure expeditionary forces to be of maximum strategic value to a
joint force and potential coalition partners, particularly the US”. To this end, a top priority project
for the army is the Land Force Omnibus ISTAR project. This will provide a capability for integrating and
distributing information from a variety of army land- and air-based surveillance and target acquisition systems.
Similarly, the Canadian Air Force is planning a comprehensive Omnibus CF-18 Incremental Modernization Project
(IMP) to upgrade its reduced fleet of CF-18A/B fighter aircraft to US model C/D configuration standards. This
project, if funded to the full estimated cost of $1.226 billion, will encompass ten individual projects
designed to overcome certain of the key interoperability problems experienced during the Gulf and Kosovo air
campaigns, and will extend the operational life of the CF-18s to about the year 2020, thereby ensuring that
they can play potentially significant roles in any future US-led coalition operations.
Strategic Airlift Capability
With respect to the CF’s strategic airlift capabilities, it is interesting to note that the DND has
evidently decided against adopting a fully integrated solution. At one point the Air Force had considered
buying as many as six Boeing C-17 aircraft for this purpose and then ‘loaning’ them to the United
States when they were not required by the CF. In return, the US would share the operating costs and would
ensure that six of their own C-17s would always be available for Canadian military missions.
According to Pat Dowsett, Project Manager for the Future Strategic Airlift Project, this ‘swap’
arrangement has fallen afoul of a variety of ‘complicating factors’ — factors having to do in
part with deciding on which country's colours would adorn the aircraft and who would crew them. There were
“political sensitivities involved in that you might see American airplanes with Canadian crews doing
Canadian jobs and the Americans might not be too happy with that,” especially if Canada were using the
C-17s to transport aid to Cuba, for example.
As a stop-gap alternative, Ottawa is now planning to convert two of its CC-150 Airbuses into strategic
refuellers, an initiative that has doubtless gained political support in the wake of the embarrassing delays
the CF faced in getting 750 Canadian troops and their 12 Coyote reconnaissance vehicles to Afghanistan. While
the refuellers [could] extend the range of Canada’s existing Hercules tactical transport fleet, the Americans
reportedly are still keen on Canada acquiring the C-17s. Dowsett explains that “should we acquire C-17s
and should we have an excess capacity during peacetime, the Americans are very interested in ... tapping into
that excess capacity.” In that model, Canada would not actually lend the aircraft to US forces, but rather
“on a case-by-case basis, we would satisfy an airlift task”. In return, “there would be an
offset, and some advantage to us in some other areas”.
Strategic Sealift Capability
The Navy is examining a slightly different approach in attempting to enhance the CF’s currently limited
strategic lift capability. Specifically, it is planning to procure modern replacements for the two elderly
fleet-replenishment ships that it now has in operation, ships absolutely essential to the support of its two
naval Task Groups. It is estimated that the Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability (ALSC) Project will cost
between $1.446 and $2.3 billion (depending on the number of ships involved), and it has been fast-tracked to
generate an initial operating capability in 2005.
In addition to supporting the Task Groups with fuel, food, spare parts and so on, the ALSC is also expected to
provide some sealift capability for troops and heavy equipment, headquarters command and control facilities,
and support capacity for joint forces ashore. It is also slated to operate independently of a jetty, a
requirement that has brought interoperability considerations into play. Commander Dave Harper, ALSC Project
Director, confirms that the ship chosen will have to be compatible with the US Navy, and reports that
“We’re wrestling with what does integration [sic] mean and we believe that if we were involved in an
allied effort, it may be wise to be able to accept a US Navy hovercraft. We would simply design the well deck
in such a way that we would have the capability of accepting one”.
These examples — and there are many others — represent genuinely innovative approaches to achieving
the interoperability objective, and they underscore the extent to which the military is factoring it into its
long-term re-equipment plans in order to help defray some of the costs of maintaining an ability to project
power abroad. To a very large degree, and in the absence of a sudden and uncharacteristic impulse on the part
of Ottawa to increase Canadian defence spending dramatically, interoperability with the Americans is the only
game in town.
Part II — Interoperability: Some Observations on the Wider
Implications
|