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Canadian Defence Procurement — updated and revised July 2004
Politics, Procurement Practices, and Procrastination:
the Quarter-Century Sea King Helicopter
Replacement Saga
Part 18 — Conclusions:
“... Some shall be pardoned, and some punishèd ...”
As the Maritime Helicopter Project slouches toward its end, it would be difficult to judge it anything other
than a rough beast. We have, in effect, reached a point of no return. Having sketched out some of the major
twists and turns of the Sea King replacement saga, it is
important to acknowledge that there is now ‘nothing but through it’. Whatever flaws remain in the
MHP are irrelevant. It must proceed or be replaced by a shorter-term
solution to replacing the CF’s Sea King fleet.
The foundation of the present tendering process was placed by John McCallum and Ralph Goodale. Having received
the ‘go’ signal from Paul Martin, David Pratt was wise enough to follow the path laid down for him.
Most revealing is what was left out of DND’s recent ‘Request for Proposals’. After 25
years of Sturm und Drang over anti-submarine warfare, there is no direct mention of ASW equipment for
these new maritime helicopters. [1]
What remains to be seen is whether relations between industry and government have been damaged beyond repair.
MHP does represent a lucrative contract but will potential suppliers – having been once burned by
the Canadian government – turn up their noses at DND’s incentives for early delivery of these
helicopters?
The entire Sea King replacement process has been something of a fiasco from its outset with politicians
taking much of the blame.[2] But this long, sorry tale – the SKR, the NSA, and the
MHP – has never been a purely political problem. It is the job of DND planners (military and civilian) to
provide procurement options which are acceptable (and understandable) to their nation’s government and its
citizens. In this, DND failed miserably. All that DND offered were competing projects and attempted
faits accompli like the CH-148 which invariably blew up in their faces.
DND has demonstrated little skill at handling its political masters and even less in its dealing with the
public. Procurement officers tend to regard politicians as their true enemy. But it is unusual for a
military bureaucracy to assume the bull-headed and self-defeating stance adopted by DND in the face of very
predictable political “interference” in the NSA and MHP. Nor was any serious attempt made by
DND planners to fully explain their concerns or requirements to the citizenry or media.
Instead of options or alternatives, Canadians were treated to a sullen bureaucracy which appeared to regard the
press, tax-payers, and elected representatives with equal hostility. This is not to say that Project
Offices at National Defence HQ are staffed with anything other than well-intentioned personnel. We would
suggest, however, that loyalties become confused and perspectives lost when projects are allowed to drift along
for years – decades should be out of the question. If there is one conclusion drawn
from the Sea King replacement story, it should be this: DND capital projects – and their
Project Offices – should have a limited life span.
If government refuses to fund a critical project, the military should abandon that capability. Had DND dropped
its anti-submarine warfare focus for New Shipboard Aircraft after the collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps
Canadian Forces aircrews would not still have to go aloft in forty-year old Sea Kings. They deserve
better.
[1] There is a vague reference to “sub-surface surveillance” but none to ASW.
[2] Even if contracts for the MHP are placed in short order (and considering the history, this is
something of a leap), there will have been 18 different Ministers of National Defence and 9 changes of
government (including those of Paul Martin) since the beginnings of that first ‘Sea King
Replacement’ Project back in 1977.
< Part 17 — “... Go hence, to have
more talk of these sad things ...”
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