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Canadian Defence Procurement — updated and revised July 2004
Politics, Procurement Practices, and Procrastination:
the Quarter-Century Sea King Helicopter
Replacement Saga
Stephen Priestley, CASR
Researcher
Part 1 — the Maritime Helicopter Project in the
Current Political Landscape
The long-delayed MHP (Maritime Helicopter Project) to find a
replacement for the CH-124 Sea King shipboard aircraft seems,
finally, to be reaching its conclusion. When this article was first written, this Project was back in the news.
A letter from Joe Volpe, then a Liberal back-bencher, caused the stir. At issue was the government’s
“lowest cost compliant” bidding rules.[1] Replacing Sea Kings has always been a highly
political issue, but it had also become highly personal.
Joe Volpe was an active Paul Martin supporter. And, it would be idle to suggest that the MHP was not
personally vexing (and politically dangerous) for the Prime Minister of the day, Jean Chrétien.
Whatever Volpe intended with that letter, his message to Liberals was clear: the Sea King
had become a major political liability. Jean Chrétien had allowed the MHP process to become
drawn-out, embarassing, and expensive. But, Volpe hinted, things would be put right under a Paul Martin
government. And, perhaps they will. One of Martin’s first acts as Prime Minister was a widespread spending
freeze. But, the MHP was among the rare exceptions.
On 17 Dec. 2003, then-Defence Minister David Pratt issued a call for tenders for 28 new maritime
helicopters (estimated at costing $3 Billion). Incentives are to be included to fast-track these new
helicopters (similar ‘carrots’ had already been put in place by John McCallum and Ralph Goodale, then
Minister for Public Works). Despite the incentives, the first shipboard helicopter from this order
won’t be operational until mid-2008. The rest of the order will be filled at a rate of one chopper per
month. In other words, the CF’s clapped-out Sea Kings must continue to serve until they can be
completely replaced by these new helicopters (of whichever type wins the Maritime Helicopter Project)
around 2010 (some say 2012 – the MHP contest stalled once again when Paul Martin dropped the writ).
Unfortunately, as most Canadians know, the decrepit Sea Kings now crash with depressing regularity.
How did we arrive at this sad state of affairs? In his paper for the Canadian Forces College, Col
BW Akitt described the Maritime Helicopter Project as a “lesson in failed civil-military relations”.
And, such statements from insiders tend to be accepted without question. After all, these
politicians aren’t experts – it must be their fault. What might get lost in the shuffle, however, is
the degree to which the Department of National Defence’s approach to planning and procurement may also
bear responsibility for this dragged-out 25-year process.
We should seize the opportunity to review the history of decision-making behind the Maritime Helicopter Project
to see what might be gleaned for use in the future.
[1] This was not the first time “lowest cost compliant” bidding rules had been an issue.
Team Cormorant (who then-Minister of National Defence John McCallum would imply was connected with the
Volpe letter) had already complained to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal that such rules unfairly penalized their bid.
> Part 2 — the Sea King Replacement
Project
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