CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
Review

Chinook CH-47D  –  Used Helicopters  –  Southern Afghanistan  –  22  March  2008 Defence  Minister  Hook'd  &  Hoodwinked  Again  —  All  Because Arrogant Air Staff  Refuse  to Yield  in  the  Interest of Our Nation Dianne  DeMille ,  Editor ,  Canadian  American  Strategic  Review  ( CASR ) Our  defence  minister,  Peter  Mackay,  slinks  home with  some  'tails'  between  his  legs According  to a  report in  Jane's Defence Weekly, the Canadian government  has agreed  to buy  six used Chinooks – 'D models' –  from the US Army. The six  ex-US Army  helicopters in question were selected  by the vendor. This is a little like walking into a used car lot and asking the salesman to pick out six  'previously-owned'  vehicles  for your fleet. In effect, our Minister of  National  Defence has managed to negotiate an inferior deal for the same model of  used CH-47Ds available through the US Army’s CHAPS program ( the Cargo Helicopter Alternate Procurement Strategy). Instead, we are dealing with the US Government. The US Army is not in a position to provide support services of any kind for this purchase – no training, no maintenance personnel, and,  most importantly,  no parts supply line. Canada will have to, once again,  prevail upon our closest allies – the Netherlands, Australia, and the UK  –  to help us out with anything that they can spare from their own over-stretched supply lines and spare parts intended for their small fleets of Chinooks in Southern Afghanistan. [1] All the money in the defence cookie jar has been spent on aircraft with 'No Political Sizzle' Why was Canada  left in this humiliating position?  Because  Prime Minister  Stephen Harper gave in to the vanity of  Air Staff planners and spent our nation's surplus on the aircraft that they  wanted  most  –  there is simply no time  –   and certainly no money  –   left  to  buy  the transport  helicopters  which are an  immediate  military  necessity  in  Southern  Afghanistan. Roto 5 has already begun. We are sending in PPCLI again. Déjà vu! No transport helicopters for this spring and summer  –  the fighting and  dying seasons.  Even the used  'D model  Chinooks cannot  be delivered until January of  2009 at the earliest  –  ie,  next winter,  the season when the Taliban's battle-hardened  Pashtun fighters return to the mountains of  western  Pakistan  to plot  their  next  campaign. What is it about powerful  politicians and  their  inability to  'Just Say No'  to the petulant foot stamping and  haughty, turned-up noses of  Air Staff ? The Air Force is certainly not going to lease Russian Mil helicopters for the sake of our soldiers on the ground.  Oh no, that would be beneath them – especially with alluring new-aircraft scents wafting through the air. Our NATO allies operate or lease Mi-17s  – even the United States –  even the CIA.  What is the problem? The  'downsides'  of  this  so-called  ' Government - to - Government '  deal  get  even  worse According to the  Jane's article,  on 12 March 2008,  exactly one day before the vote in Parliament  to extend the Afghan mission, the Government of  Canada issued a new Request for Proposals (RFP) for the Medium to Heavy Lift  Helicopter (MHLH) project. This is puzzling, because the Government had already issued an Advanced Contract Award Notice (ACAN) for Boeing Chinook helicopters. Compared with ACANs, RFPs are a retrograde step. Perhaps this RFP was a way of assuring Boeing – and the US Army – that Canada understood that the used  'D model Chinooks were not a part of any 'trade-in' package.  DND had rejected CHAPS out of  hand two years earlier and this wasn't an attempt to resuscitate a CHAPS deal. Why  would  the  Government  issue  an  RFP  for  new  helicopters  a day  before  the  Vote? Alternatively, the RFP may be a way of placating the Air Force that they were not going to get stuck with used Chinooks. Did  they need  reassurance  that  they  could continue to  ' tweak ' the specifications for their new Chinook purchase so that they will be able to get at least some of the bells-and-whistles of  the less politically-acceptable special forces variant, the MH-47G? Of course, DND could have negotiated a trade-in deal as part of an arrangement combining refurbished  CHAPS  CH-47D models followed by the sought-after new-production CH-47F Chinooks. But they didn't. Based on past experience, Air Force planners are deathly afraid of 'interim' solutions  (which have a nasty habit of becoming permanent ).  So, a chance at quick delivery of  interim CHAPS  helicopters was eschewed. Better to wait for the perfect solution in 2012 – even at risk of CF soldiers on Kandahar roads. There is another possibility that is even more stomach-churning.  Do  Air Staff  planners show any indication of actually wanting  to buy helicopters?  Fixed-wing aircraft get bought, but the 25-year project  to replace Sea Kings still hasn't borne fruit. And,  despite constant complaints about CH-146 Griffons as military helicopters, there's been no moves to 'liquidate' these assets on a healthy civilian market for this type. Do helicopters simply get in the way of 'real' aircraft? By definition, an RFP is  'further back' in the procurement process than an ACAN. [2]  What if the Air Force or the PMO or the Privy Council (or all of the above) want to 'postpone' the new CH-47F+ model  Chinook  purchase as long as possible (now that  the political manoeuvre of getting a few clapped-out 'D model Chinooks for, say, February 2009, has been accomplished. Technically, it appeases the Manley Commission and  the Liberal  Party MPs lining up to vote. The only other explanation for issuing a new RFP at this late stage of  negotiations is  that  the ACAN  for new Chinooks had already failed.  The MHLH project was behind schedule because Air Staff continues to make changes to the original specifications. And  having the requirement in constant flux makes a mockery of the ACAN process  –  a process that in- coming  Harper Tories assured us would be 'transparent'. [3] What Air Staff  wants,  Air Staff  gets  –  And even frugal,  neo-con Prime Ministers submit The Air Force got their C-17 Globemaster III  ACAN first.  Then they got the C-130J Hercules. What if  Air  Staff has just lost interest in the new CH-47F Chinook? What if  they believe that it would be better to put the purchase 'on the back burner' until their grumpy Prime Minister  is once again 'in the vein' to spend billions of dollars on aircraft for our undeployable Air Force? When are the elected officials of this country going to wake up and see that Air Staff planners have never,  will never, put the interests of  this country before their own vanity?  Bureaucrats in uniform awaiting plummy industry jobs need to be brought sharply to heel.  They've sworn their lives to their  Sovereign  –  that collective  'sovereign'  is,  in fact,  the citizens of  Canada. [1] Regional Command South usually has access to three Dutch Chinooks, eight British HC2s, two Australian CH-47Ds (all based at KAF), and 25 US Army Chinooks (shared with RC East). All of these helicopters are operating in a very trying environment — hot-and-high and dusty. [2] As a procurement tool,  an RFP should arrive at  the most cost-effective solution while still meeting the identified requirements. ACANs,  by contrast,  demonstrate an intention  to solicit bids and negotiate with one firm – in this case, The Boeing Company. [ See: Chinook ACAN ] [3]  Instead of  the promised  "tranparency",  this RFP for Chinooks was not publicly released. RFPs are usually publicly available on the Government Electronic Tendering Service  (MERX). However, as with the late December 2007 C-130J Hercules ACAN, the government has chosen to conceal the details of  their dealings with industry – a retrograde step with no explanations.