CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
Review

CF Expeditionary Force  –  Southeast Afghanistan  –  Published Oct 2005 Hillier's Hopes for the Holidays  –  Honkin' Huge Helicopters! Dianne DeMille & Stephen Priestley  –  published  in  View  from  the  West* [Ed: This article was first published in October 2005.  It was written with a tone of extreme urgency  at  that  time.  Both authors knew that,  if the available options were not pursued,  the result would be 'zero helicopters' for both our infantry and our engineers in Afghanistan.  The choice was between 'something' or 'nothing'. The  Liberal  Government  and  Air  Command  chose  nothing. Now, we have a minority Conservative government.  Canada has been presented with a chance for a low-cost, interim solution to ameliorate the current dangerous and humiliating situation into which we have put our soldiers. Here is a chance for Stephen Harper  to  prove  that  he is  both   practical  and   fiscally conservative. He can give the order to lease the readily-available Russian helicopters for tactical support and transport in Afghanistan. If he does, our soldiers will at last  have the backup they deserve,  when  they need it most.  Over to you,  Mr. Prime Minister.] In February of 2006,  Canadian Forces will be sending an expeditionary force to the border between south - east  Afghanistan and  western  Pakistan, to take part in combat along with other coalition forces, under the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom. The question is:  Are the  Canadian  Forces  (CF)  fully equipped for this mission?  Probably not. In a CP article published on 14 September 2005,  Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, admitted that, in this crucial deployment, the CF won't have all the support equipment it needs. "Heavy helicopters,  for example  –  we don't have any at the moment.  They  will be furnished either by the Dutch, the British, or the Americans, or by other allies." According to the  CP  article,  the last time the  CF participated in OEF,  our  troops "relied  exclusively on  US  Chinook  helicopters to get  them  in and  out of  battle zones,  as well as  to resupply them.  The arrangement proved unsatisfactory, with the [CF]  inevitably  shuffled  to the bottom of  the Americans' overloaded priority lists.  On one mission,  [CF personnel]  began  running  out  of  food and water ..." Ask Yourself  the Question:   Why does Canada  have no Chinook  Helicopters? The answer is simple. Because the Mulroney government sold ours to the Netherlands.  So,  the Dutch will be there on the Pak-Afghan border,  fighting alongside us,  killing Taleban  resurgents,  using  our  ex - Chinooks.  And  our CF personnel  may have to beg  them  for a  ride.  Here's a 'lesson  learned'  for decision - makers  (politicians and air staff  planners):    Sometimes usable,  necessary assets are more valuable than the  money  you get  from selling them. Shortly after becoming  Chief  of  Defence Staff  (CDS),  General  Rick  Hillier  made the acquisition  of medium - lift  helicopters a  priority.  The aircraft he had in mind was the Chinook.  This is the  workhorse  troop  transport  and  re-supply  aircraft required   for   modern,   highly - mobile   warfare.  The  Chinook  can  carry  up  to 44  fully - armed  troops,  it  can  also  sling  cargo  from  up  to  three  belly  hooks. Operational features give the Chinook advantages  –  especially in Afghanistan. Ungainly as the Chinook  might appear,  its unusual  features give it a  distinctive advantage in south-east  Afghanistan.  In the mountains along  the  Pak - Afghan border,  the air is thin,  and  summer  temperatures can  reach  50  degrees  Celsius. In such 'hot - and - high' conditions, turbine engines lose power and rotor blades claw for lift. Most helicopters begin to lose the stabilizing effect of their tail rotors. But, of course,  the counter-rotating Chinook has no tail  rotor. This  twin - rotored  configuration  bestows other operational advantages on the Chinook. When troops use the aft loading ramp,  the spinning blades of the rear rotor are safely high above them  (unlike a conventional  helicopter's  vertical  stabilizing  rotor). The twin rotors also give the Chinook great stability. Skilled pilots hover with only the rear landing wheels touching the ground to facilitate unloading. Chinook pilots in  Afghanistan routinely use this technique to offload on uneven ground  (or even on rooftops, left). Complete Breakdown in Strategic Planning within the top Echelon of Air Staff? Minister Bill Graham announced that it was  "unlikely,  given the nature of military procurement,  [that]  we  would  be able to  acquire  anything" new  in time for  the February  2006  deployment   –    beyond  some  "isolated  pieces  of  equipment." Indeed,  much of  the  money  for  badly - needed  CF  equipment  is  coming  from 'operational contingency'  funds.  This  ad hoc  approach  to  purchasing  can  get minor items of new equipment into the field quickly,  but it is also a tacit admission that  the 'official' planning and  procurement system has completely broken down. Money is not the biggest problem here – it's timing. With a little over four months to go before Canadian troops return to combat,  Chinooks are suddenly a priority. Air Staff  have just announced a plan to  dispense  with  competitive  bidding  and speed up the buying of new aircraft  –  including 20 new Chinooks. The trouble is, there are  none  to  be  had,  "not  even  for  ready  money".  Everyone wants them. Given that  Chinooks  are currently  unavailable to  the  CF,  what are the options before  the  Chief  of  Defence  Staff   (CDS)  for  the  February  2006  deployment? 1) Temporarily use the 15 CH-149 Cormorant search-and-rescue helicopters. Among the aircraft already in CF service, the CH-149 Cormorant is the closest in capabilities to the Chinook.  Cormorants are really utility transport helicopters adapted for SAR.  As troop carriers,  the CH-149s  could carry 30 fully-equipped soldiers plus crew. And, being powerful, three-engined helicopters, Cormorants can easily cope with 'hot-and-high' conditions and lifting heavy sling loads. The upside: Canadian Forces crews are already fully trained on the Cormorant, so redeployment involves little more than a coat of paint and a tranfer of troops. Canada owns these helicopters, so it is a simple command decision – no need to run the procurement gauntlets of  Cabinet,  Public  Works,  Treasury  Board,  etc. The  downside:  The  Cormorants are having reliability problems and are rapidly chewing  through spare parts. There may be no ready fix to the reliability problems. DND could simply buy as  many  tail  rotor bits, and any other spare parts we need, and just get the job done. Finally, replacement  SAR helicopters would be needed. Finding replacements for the SAR role is the easy part. Most other countries farm this work out to civilian contractors.  (After all,  as  traumatic  as  it  may  be  to  be lost in  the wilderness, or  to find oneself  aboard a  foundering  ship,  such events are not really threats to national security.)  One of the major international suppliers of contracted civilian SAR services – helicopters and crews (including SAR techs) – is CHC based in St. John's.  As it happens, CHC also features in our next option. [ Update: In Nov 2009, the British equivalent to the Cormorant, the RAF's Merlin began operations in Helmand. The Italian Navy have since announced that, from Oct 2010, they too will be operating EH101s to back their CH-47s in Afghanistan.] 2) Contract  civilian  medium - lift  helicopters,  until  new  CF  Chinooks  arrive. When the CF were involved with the UN Stabilization Force in Bosnia, medium-lift was provided by Russian-made Mil helicopters under a lease organized by CHC of Newfoundland. When the mission came under NATO control, the leased aircraft were replaced by similar Mil 17 helicopters from the Czech Air Force. Leased Mil 17s (and earlier Mil 8s) are already at work for others in Afghanistan. A 'wet lease' is the typical arrangement – ie: leasing the helicopter complete with flightcrew and fuel. DND is fully familiar with such deals. (This is how DND is able to lease those enormous Russian-made strategic transport aircraft.) The upside:   Immediate availability and CF familiarity with the Mil helicopter's capabilities. The very low cost of Russian-made equipment also means that such a lease will take only a minor bite out of savings for future Chinook purchases. The downside: The Mil is smaller than both the Cormorant and the Chinook. A realistic troop load for the Mil 17 is only 24 combat-ready soldiers. The external sling load is only 3000kgs – 2/3rd that of a Cormorant, and less than a quarter that of a Chinook. There is also the uncertainty of civilian pilots going into a combat zone. Civilian Ukrainian and Russian aircrews  flying  into Sarajevo were willing to take almost unbelievable risks. But can such bravery be absolutely relied upon, even with a CF commander sitting in the 'jump seat'? There is one other Mil 17 option with a Canadian connection – a lease-to-own arrangement. Kelowna Flightcraft has helped to develop a modernized version of this helicopter, the Mi-17KF (at times called the Kittiwake), which can feature a fully western cockpit and rear-loading ramp (important for quick egress). These westernized Mi-17KF helicopters are produced in the Mil factory in Kazan, Russia. This is only a 3000km flight to Kandahar. Compare that with the CF's two- day jet flights from CFB Trenton, doglegging through the Persian Gulf. Obviously, at the end of the lease, Canada would gain the assets. Total purchase price is important to the cash-strapped Canadian Forces.  Current prices for new Mil 17s are listed at just over US $5 Million  –  a fifth the replacement cost for the Cormorants, a tenth the likely cost of Chinooks. [ Update: In Nov 2008, DND leased six Mi-8s from Skylink Aviation of Toronto to take the pressure off of its similarly-sized fleet of used Chinooks in Afghanistan.] 3) The final option is to follow the Air Force's advice and "hold out for the best". The upside: the Chinook is the best medium-lift helicopter. (One wonders why the Air Force sacrificed their Chinooks when Mulroney's hatchet men came calling. There were other less critical aircraft that could have been offered up.) The downside:  In the short-term, this option means relying on our  long-suffering allies  to transport CF troops in their Chinooks.  When,  at last,  a procure- ment opportunity  finally comes,  global competition for new or used  Chinooks  will be fierce, and prices will climb. Maybe DND  will  be  able  to  buy  rebuilt or new - production  Chinooks  before the shooting stops in  south - eastern Afghanistan.  Probably not. So,  the  immediate  options  before  General  Rick  Hillier  reveal  a  tough  choice. Hillier can  (1)  order  a  coat  of  Army  green  paint  for  the  15  SAR  Comorants, (2)  lease  (or  lease - to - own)  Russian  Mil  17s,  or  (3)  beg  for  rides  on  allies' Chinooks,  until the Air Force is completely happy with  its  latest  shopping  list. The purpose of an analyst is to present the options. It will be up to General Hillier to make  the  final  recommendations to the  Minister  and his  Cabinet colleagues. Canada is a rich country.  Why are we the only nation  that is sending  its infantry into this combat zone with no transport helicopters to supply them? No helicopter to evacuate  the  wounded,  or  those who  become  trapped  in a  lethal  situation? [ Update: In the end a hybrid arrangement was arrived at. The Harper government announced an ACAN for 16 CH-47Fs in July 2006 but the actual order (reduced to 15 CH-147Fs) wasn't placed until Aug 2009 (with delivery not until 2013-14). After belatedly examining CHAPS, six used US Army Chinooks were bought for CF use in Afghanistan. The 6 CH-147Ds began operations in Feb 2009 escorted by armed CH-146 Griffon utility helicopters and  backed up by six leased  Mi-8 transports as part of  JTF-Afg Air Wing. One CH-147D was reported lost in action in Aug 2010.] Dianne  DeMille  is  the  editor  of  the  Canadian  American  Strategic  Review. Stephen Priestley is the creator of  DND 101 - A Visual Guide to CF Equipment. *First  published  in View from the West,  a column  in  the  Winnipeg  Free  Press. The  WFP  is  the  last  major  independent  newspaper  left  in  Western  Canada.