NATO in Afghanistan – Medium Helicopters
– Southern Afghanistan – 06 April 2008
The Burden-Sharing Summit Begets a NATO
Helicopter Trust Fund
Gordon Brown's Dating Service for Available Medium-Lift Helicopters
Stephen Priestley, Researcher, Canadian American
Strategic Review ( CASR )
Members of ISAF in southern Afghanistan are critically short of medium-lift helicopters.
Partly this is
due to the revival of air assault tactics [1] partly that only the most powerful helicopters
function well in the 'hot-and-high' environment of an Afghan summer. ISAF members find their utility
helicopters (and even smaller medium-lift helicopters) inadequate to the task. A Chinook is the
helicopter of choice but also a rara avis.
The annual NATO summit meeting – held this year in Bucharest – was heralded as holding the promise of
salvation for Canada (more for additional troops on the ground rather than our on- going helicopter
shortage). But it was not to be. The 700 French paratroops will go to eastern Afghanistan not to the
south. The US Marines (24th MEU) recently arrived in Kandahar are to act as a manoeuvre force throughout RC South
– they aren’t there to bolster Canadian Forces.
Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay, has been twisting arms to get additional NATO troops
in Kandahar. As with previous attempts to get allies to deploy more of their Chinooks, this was a
failure. Fortunately, the spinmeisters had already provided a straw for Mr. MacKay to clutch at: announce
that the 700 French paras might free up US troops to redeploy from the east to assist the CF in Kandahar.
Problem solved, victory declared, totally successful summit.
How It's Done – British Prime Minister Gordon Brown Works Corridors and Back-Rooms
In contrast to Canadian political efforts in Bucharest, UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, "had been talking in
the margins" on behalf of an Anglo-French scheme to increase the numbers of available medium-lift helicopters
in southern Afghanistan as quickly as possible. Some £3M – some reports say £5M –
was already available to ensure the success of the proposed scheme.
Britain already has Chinooks and other helicopters in southern Afghanistan. There just are
not enough. Mr. Brown is trying to extricate British forces from Iraq but was told it would be almost a
year before additional Chinooks would be available for service in Afghanistan. As a stop-gap, British
Sea Kings had deployed to support Royal Marines in Helmand. By Canadian standards, that all
sounds pretty good. But it wasn't enough for Mr. Brown. The British effort to re-take Musa Qala would likely
have been a far bloodier affair without a flanking air assault. Clearly, more choppers were urgently
required.
As pitched at the Bucharest summit, Mr. Brown’s helicopter trust fund would provide a simple way for those NATO
member countries which had not provided troops for the ISAF mission to contribute
capital or equipment instead. On 03 April 2008, Mr. Brown said that eight nations were committed to his
helicopter trust fund scheme. Contributors to this trust fund were not announced but this scheme was
said to have been "set up after discussions with the French".
Anglo-French Helicopter Trust Fund – Who's In, Who's Out, Who
Might be Left Behind?
On 04 April 2008, The Guardian speculated that the list of
helicopter trust fund contributors likely included "Australia, Austria, Luxembourg and Norway".
Obviously the UK and France are onboard and The Times Online mentioned the "18 mothballed Czech and Hungarian Mils".
So is that the list? Not according to the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates. In his press conference
given on 4 April 2008, Mr. Gates revealed that 10 nations had now committed funds to this helicopter trust fund.
Mr. Gates said that the United States had not yet joined but added that the trust fund scheme was “a very
interesting idea”. It is not surprising that the US would support a plan that took pressure off of their
Chinook fleet. Nor would they discourage increased involvement by "new NATO" or use of
Mil Mi-17s in Afghanistan. [2]
Conspicuously missing from the tentative (and growing) list of participants in this helicopter trust
fund is Canada. Perhaps, having declared "Mission accomplished !" after the Bucharest summit,
Prime Minister Harper could not then announce that Canada had been forced to join a pool of Mils (a
helicopter type 'which dare not speak its name' in Chinook-obsessed Ottawa).
But does that mean that Canada will not quietly join the queue for access to NATO's Mi-17s?
Opportunities fumbled again but is Canada too late to join NATO's Helicopter Trust
Fund?
The Canadian government has come home empty-handed from Bucharest because it played the wrong
game. MND Peter MacKay went out in advance, demanding Chinooks from NATO allies who had previously
refused (and having shown an embarassing lack of grace when the Poles offered the use of Mi-17s).
Mr. Harper then followed with a diplomatic effort to smooth the ruffled feathers of European
allies. This left Chancellor Merkel smiling but perhaps only in anticipation of terms like minnow or milquetoast
being applied to Canada in the German media.
This may be moot. In forcing a vote to extend Canada's commit- ment to the Afghan mission
before the Bucharest NATO summit, the Harper government gave away any bargaining power it might have had.
But any such power should not be over-estimated. Mr. MacKay's German opposite, Franz-Josef Jung,
had priorities of his own at Bucharest. Herr Jung circulated a draft "master plan" which
included a discussion of “burden-sharing” among NATO allies but which is primarily an exit strategy
from Afghanistan. In other words, Germany has become bored with the ISAF mission.
From Each According to His Capability – "Come thou no more for ransom, gentle
herald."
There is nothing new in a divergence in attitude between the NATO members doing the hard work in
Afghanistan and those who thought it clever to stay safely on the sidelines. What Mr. Brown’s helicopter
trust fund concept has done is highlight the difference between paying in blood and paying in cash. For
different reasons, both Canada and Germany have been caught in that spotlight – Germany because it
is one of the major NATO members which has refused combat assignments; Canada because it proved, yet
again, incapable of
equipping its soldiers.
Fortunately for Canada, in this case, someone has already done our thinking for us. Mr. Brown recognized the critical
need for medium-lift helicopters – despite the needs of his own country being far less desperate than
those of Canada. Mr. Brown had also recognized the opportunity to match ready capital with available assets
(in other words, taking cash from the ' lead-averse ' to re-shoe otherwise willing bearers to support the
armies in the field ). Mr. Brown claims that schemes such as his helicopter trust fund were "going to
be the model for the future". And he is right. The wording may lack modesty but, then again, where
has diffidence gotten Canada ?
Mr. Harper’s charm offensive in Bucharest produced no results other than 'positive-positive' spin at
home and a return to sneering contempt from our "friends and allies". With or without fanfare,
the Canadian government should swallow its pride, cut a cheque for $6M, and join the NATO helicopter trust fund.
Canadian lives on Kandahar roads this summer will depend on it.
[1] Air assault never really went away but there is a renewed emphasis. In Afghanistan, the
real difference is that the tactic relies on few Chinooks rather than on many utility helicopters.
[2] The US Army has, on average, 25 CH-47 Chinooks shared between RC East and RC South. But US special forces
and the CIA both employ Mil helicopters in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The US government also chose the Mi-17
to equip the Afghan military and drug enforcement.
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