CASR

Canadian
American
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Canadian Forces  –  Southern Afghanistan  –  Defence Spending  –  June 2006 $15 Billion Shopping Spree or Time for Some Horse-Trading? Chinooks Now! C-17s... My People Will Call Your People, Eh? Stephen Priestley,  CASR Staff Newspaper columns are filled with speculation around what might be revealed about an anticipated $15 billion in defence spending by the Harper government.  Due to be announced after the  House of  Commons has recessed  for the summer, this “package” is expected to include huge strategic Boeing C-17 airlifters, Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules, enormous Joint Support Ships, 1000 medium trucks replacing MLVWs, and last, but not least, brand-new Boeing Chinook medium- lift helicopters. After the gutting of  the Canadian Forces by the Chrétien Liberals, such spending should  be good news. But what, if any of this pricey equipment will find itself headed off to Afghanistan any time soon. Jack Granatstein was quoted in a Toronto Star column, saying that the pending $15B spending spree “... will go a long way toward filling the gaps...”. Maybe so, but it will also take a long time – time that  the Canadian Forces troops in Afghanistan do not have.  None of the fruits of this spending will be delivered to the field for years. Of course, planning  for the future is crucial  but now is not the time. The Government forced a vote to make a longer Canadian commitment to the mission to southeastern Afghanistan. Rather than “staying the course”, a future-gazing approach to purchases imperils that Afghan mission. Multiple opportunities exist to move quickly to patch critical equipment shortfalls for the deployment to Afghanistan.  Members of  the Canadian Forces are under- standably suspicious of calls for delayed gratification (there have been too many procurement disappointments in the past).  But,  this time,  we have troops under fire. Make sure that the ‘sharp end’ has what is truly requires first.   In aviation: •  leased airlifters are more cost-effective in the short-run.  (Transport aircraft are,    after all, just fancy packaging for the vastly more important things they deliver -    the troops, their vehicles and equipment, supplies, etc.) •  refurbished Chinook medium-lift helicopters as an interim solution  (the ‘used’    Chinooks can be traded back as the ‘new-build’ CF helicopters are completed ). The Globe & Mail noted that it takes “30 months to build and  deliver a Chinook”.  That translates into at least three years before Canada can field a usable force of medium-lift helicopters. A quicker delivery is possible through the Boeing Chinook buy-back and refurbish program (CHAPS) yet the Air Force is not interested and Boeing won’t talk about  it anymore. Why? Because, between C-17s and Chinooks, Boeing knew they had a live one - the mall’s open and  in walks  Canada like a suburban shopper, Gold Card in hand. Buying interim equipment puts less money in Boeing Military’s pocket on Friday. However, it’s the job of the Canadian government to have a care for the Canadian Forces troops on the ground, not Boeing’s. So why, when those troops are under fire today, are all of DND’s plans aimed at sparkly new toys years down the road? Perhaps it is just that, when compared with huge shiny airplanes, drab-coloured trucks and armoured vehicles are dull  in the eyes of the public. Well, the public are not very keen on CF soldiers coming home in boxes either.  If  it’s just a popularity contest, Mr. Harper, you’d be better off  investing in vehicles that  keep Canadian troops alive. Here again, more immediate solutions exist and General Hillier has shown the way: •  Issue an Immediate Operational Requirement for armour-cabbed FMTV trucks in    sufficient numbers for the Afghan deployment. ( This is the truck DND wants to    buy anyway. It is also a close match for the CF’s larger, 10t HLVW trucks which    are currently being beat to death as the only reliable truck in SE Afghanistan). •  Place orders with GDLS-Canada to make good attrition on the LAV III and Bison    armoured vehicles. (It would make sense to replace the aging Bison with a ‘boxy’    LAV III derivative but there is no time and the Bison fleet is rapidly wearing out.) •  Put new blast-resistant logistics vehicles into the field to replace the old LSVWs    which cannot safely leave CF bases  (even with their ‘applique armour’ in place). •  Place further orders with BAE OMC for more Nyala Armour Patrol Vehicles  so    that vulnerable, targeted G-Wagons can be completely removed from the field. No competition is needed for the modest numbers involved with an IOR. There are also hidden advantages to IORs on the vehicle types listed above.  The  Canadian military is perpetually out of step. We either dither over specifications for decades or wait until forced  to replace out-dated or broken down gear. As a result, we buy high-priced equipment  that has already  reached  the end of a technological wave. For example, the FMTVs: the CF has been trying to single-source this  US-built  truck  for years. And it would have made good sense in the early ’90s. But this is a tweaked, 35-year old design,  which is why it matches our old HLVW. Like the C-17, the FMTV is nearer the end of its current production run than the beginning. Is this the Iltis all over again? Will Stephen Harper try to address a fiscal imbalance by moving FMTV production to Quebec?  If so, what of  Ontario? Better to buy a small numberof FMTVs for Afghanistan. The interim FMTV would allow DND to delay the MLVW replacement until the US Army’s Future Transport Truck is in production. Following the current plan, the CF will be stuck once again with technology well past its ‘best-before’ date  – a poorly protected, last-of-type vehicle, while our allies will  be driving well-armoured diesel-electric hybrid trucks. Unfortunately, the current DND procurement approach aims entirely at future pay-offs.  Some are admirable but none will put equipment into the field in Afghanistan quickly. Stephen Harper, et al cannot be blamed for this –  a government must rely  on the advice  they receive  from their  military planners. But, the government is ultimately responsible for the money. The Harper government spent $35 Million to fill an option for 25 additional Nyala APVs. Good move  –  previous APVs were delivered to the troops in Afghanistan within 5 months.  But now the government will spend $15 Billion on future-gazing fancy packaging  –  wrapped up in the flag and sold as “supporting our troops in Afghanistan”. But how long before our first ‘CC-17A’ flies a new truck into KAF? We are at a critical point.  Honour dictates  that any  long-term military ‘wish lists’ get shelved to provide the troops in Afghanistan with whatever they need today. That means interim medium-lift helicopters and  great attention given to armoured vehicles  (including trucks for logistics).  Protect and fully equip the troops in the field.  Then go shopping for fancy frills like strategic airlift or satisfy requirements for entire fleets of new trucks (most of which will never see a foreign deployment). Put bluntly, Mr. Harper, you are listening to the wrong people. Think back to your trip to Kandahar.  Ask your advisors what is needed  by the infantry, artillery, and other troops  in-theatre  right  now.  The Canadian Forces is no longer a peacetime army.  Self-serving careerists will quickly reveal themselves. Ignore bureaucrats in uniform (such ‘employees’ must be satisfied with pensions later). Or, maybe those officers who slide from career-making CF project offices into cosy positions in the defence industry will now fall under the terms of  the Federal Accountability Act ?