CASR

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Blast  Resistant  Vehicles  –  Study  of  Fatalities  in  Iraq  –  June  2006 Battling  the  Bomb - Makers:   an  Unclassified  Study  of Iraq Fatalities  vs  Vehicle Type  –  Lessons  for  the  CF? Summary  of  Conclusions  from  a  Working  Paper  by  James  Hasik [1] The US Army and Marines need some more blast-protected trucks  –  a lot more The [study]  makes  clear  that  the  US  Army  experienced  a  serious  up-swing in  vehicular  fatalities  in  the  latter  half  of  2005,  and  that  the  percentage  of fatalities  experienced  in vehicles  remained  relatively high  through [early] 2006. Understanding the causes of fatalities leads to ways of limiting them.  Further efforts to combat the RPG-7 [ Rocket - Propelled  Grenade - launchers,  right ] are probably  overkill,  since current  measures  appear  to be sufficient.  New tandem warheads for weapons like the  RPG-29  are another matter.  [Ed: this would apply equally  to  another  dual - warhead  grenade,  the  PG-7VR  (lower),  for  RPG-7s.] Press reports broadly indicate that the reason  [ for higher US Army fatality rates] is larger, more sophisticated, and better-placed roadside bombs. The Army's own fatality reports support this. Upping  the  armour  protection,   while  maintaining  military  vehicle  mobility The question, then,  is how to limit  fatalities by equipping the troops with better armoured transport, while still preserving their ability to undertake their missions. For  mounted  troops ,   the  mechanism  is  obvious: troops riding  in trucks and  Humvees  present  more enticing  targets  than  troops  on  foot ,  since  they are necessarily clustered, but relatively unprotected (even if  [the target vehicle has been] 'up-armored' ). Dismounted troops could also experience the benefit, if better armoured transport meant that they could dismount closer to their objectives, or in some cases, not at all.  It is reasonable to suggest  that many of  the fatalities amongst  light  infantry and cavalry units  in Iraq occur because the troops must  dismount rather far from their objectives, since  Humvees and  trucks are not very bullet- or blast-resistant. The fight in Iraq today is substantially against bomb- makers, and disarming their bombs is generally better done from the safety of  an armoured EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal ] vehicle,  such as the Buffalo by Force Protection [at left, with its distinctive "spork"]. Sending more Abrams [main battle tanks] ,  Bradleys [infantry fighting vehicles] , or M113s  [ tracked engineering support vehicles]  to Iraq may not be the answer. These vehicles were not designed  ab initio to protect  against bomb blasts from below,  but  [ were optimized for ]  penetrating projectiles  from the front and side. Against  the latter,  they are doing a good job  –  so good ... that traffic accidents appear to be a  considerably  larger  problem  for  troops  in  Iraq  than  are  RPGs. The Stryker [M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) , essentially a  LAV III without its turret , the M1126 is fitted with the same RWS as the CF Nyala APV], with its steel armour, may provide better protection against car bomb blasts  and  the  like, but [interim] analysis requires more complete, case-by-case data from the Army (...data ...almost certainly classified). No fatalities, however, were reported during the period of analysis in the growing  number of  Cougar,  Buffalo, and RG-31 armoured trucks in Iraq. There are now perhaps 300 of  these vehicles  in use in Iraq by  the US Army,  USMC, and  the British Army, and  only  this month  were the first three  fatalities  experienced  in  two separate  EOD efforts. Private Alva Gaylord of  the 110th Missouri Engineer Battalion  died on 5 May at Qasr ar Riyy, in an RG-31 from the blast of a bomb that his team was trying to de- fuse.  Staff  Sgt. Gavin Reinke and  Specialist  Bryan Quinton of  the 5th Engineer Bn. died the day before in Baghdad in their RG-31 trying to defuse another bomb. It is important to note that the RG-31, which is built in South Africa by BAE Land Systems OMC, is a mine-protected troop carrier. It is not purpose-built as an EOD vehicle in the same way as Force Protection's Buffalo with its long, armoured, bomb-grasping spork , and it [ the South African RG-31 ]  is also designed specific- ally to provide blast protection from beneath,  not the side. Each type of vehicle has its purpose, but neither will be equally effective [ at both tasks ].  In any case, while casualties are unfortunate,  [the data  serves]  to illustrate  the value of  this type of vehicle , both  for mine-protected troop transport  and  for bomb disposal. In the summer of 2005,  insurgents in Baghdad  began spraying walls with Arabic graffiti  messages equivalent  to 'Kill the Claw' [referring to]  the spork at the end  of the Buffalo armoured truck.  [It] was rather disrupting their bombing campaign. Changes to  US  Procurement  Plans  based on 'Operational Experience'  in Iraq Unsurprisingly,  the US Army recently amended its vehicle procurement plans to add another 250 Buffalos between 2007 and  2009, and the Senate Armed  Services  Committee,  in early  May 2006, voted to add  $100 million to the...budget  to buy up to 150 Cougars and Buffalos for the Marines. Assuming  that  the  plans  hold,  these purchases will  bring the total  number of armoured trucks in US service to over 600. That's a good start.  Just as significant are the Iraqi Army's plans. On  its behalf,  the  US Army  recently awarded a  $450 million contract to a team of BAE Systems, Force Protection, and chassis supplier Spartan Motors for  1,050  modified Cougar [types to be used as]  troops carriers. Armoured trucks are not the right vehicle for mechanized assault units, so neither the US Army  nor the Marines would  be well-advised  to abandon their Bradleys, Strykers,  M113s, or  Amtracks entirely  [in favour  of the  armoured  truck types]. However,  if  the  US  Army  and  the  Marines  expect  to  continue  to engage  in counter-insurgency that they are waging in Iraq, then supplementing the force – particularly infantry and EOD units – with a relatively large number of [armoured truck  types]  will go far towards bringing  the right vehicles to the battle at hand. [CASR comment:  Can Canada  learn any lessons from this unclassified study of  vehicular  fatalities in Iraq?  Conditions  (and vehicle types)  are different  for the Canadian Forces,  but  it is obvious that  insurgents in southern Afghanistan are learning  their  lessons  from  the  tactics  used  in  Iraq.  How  well - prepared , or well - protected , are  CF troops?  Could  these  statistics  on  US  Army  fatalities in Iraq be useful in guiding  procurement decisions  for the CF Afghan mission?] [1]  James Hasik's CV is published on his website. Mr. Hasik's full working paper, Professional  Grade:  a working  paper  on  US Army  vehicle  fatalities  in Iraq, is  available  –  complete  with  graphs  for  each  vehicle  type  –   in   PDF  format.