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Defence Policy  –  Conservative Party  –  December 2005

Stephen Harper announces the new defence policy
put forward by the Conservative Party of Canada – Pt 3


Dianne DeMille & Stephen Priestley  –  this article has been expanded from
'briefing  notes'  prepared  by  CASR  for  the  CBC  on  22  December  2005

Listening In: the 'Arctic National Sensor System'

In contrast with newly-built, armed icebreakers, the Conservative Party's  proposed listening posts  (or the 'Arctic National Sensor System') is more readily achievable. There are technical hurdles (primarily in coping with extreme cold and the thick, ever-shifting sea ice.  But hydrophones placed on the seafloor or semi-disposable sono-buoys tough enough to drift with the ice floes are not insurmountable problems.

Clever techno-fixes aside, what are the challenges? There are obvious spots to place sensors such as choke points in the Northwest Passage and in Nares Strait (by placing sensors in choke points, an alien vessel  must pass close by and sensors need not be as sensitive). A choke point creates its own challenges, though. In the case of hydro- phones moored on the bottom, any cables to shore must be laid in such a way  that they can survive the seasonal formation, movement, and  breakup of  ice  –  a daunting, but not impossible, task.

Somewhat trickier are the policy questions raised  by the Tories' proposed Arctic National Sensor System. How can listening posts or remote sensors be made more effective than the flag-planting exercises which Mr. Harper has been denigrating ? Emplaced sensors gather data passively, but what do we do with this information? Whose vessel was it?  How do we register a complaint with the relevant embassy?

The question of identification becomes critical when foreign submarines transit under the Arctic ice. Whose submarine is it? Since we are talking about the Canadian Forces enforcing our Arctic sovereignty claims, what is an appropriate military response to unauthorized incursions? Since alien submarines beneath the Arctic ice represent a serious environmental risk (whether nuclear or AIP) , a military stalemate will be reached very quickly in peacetime.  No government will  authorize the depth-charging of a sub (most likely belonging to a 'friendly' power) in the Arctic.

The question of foreign submarines came to a head when the US Navy's  SSN 766 (USS Charlotte) transitted the North Pole on its way from Pearl Harbor to Norfolk, Va. Did this nuclear-powered sub pass through Canadian waters? It's possible but we don't know. More to the point, what would the Canadian government do had it been aware of the submarine's unauthorized presense?  Prime Minister Martin has dismissed the Conservative Party's sensor system proposal on grounds of cost.

Sovereignty does have a high cost. But that's why it behooves us to invest most of our efforts (and money) in effective systems. Laying and maintaining a sensor system may be a part of the solution. However, sensors will provide little benefit until we have a systemic response to threats facing Canadian Arctic sovereignty.

Fortunately, there is a simple but effective solution to the current 'action deficit'. Install hydrophones (or other technologies) and listen for submarines in the area. Once detected, automatically broadcast the location of any and all submarines. It doesn't matter who that submarine belongs to. No navy wants the location of  its subs revealed  –  but Canada loses nothing by making this information public. [4]

The message will be clear enough: if you don't want your submarine's location broadcast on the radio or internet, then  do not go near any Canadian-claimed waters in the Arctic –  or the international waters of Nares Strait or Baffin Bay.  It is only by such highly public action that any sensor system will be of value in asserting  Canadian sovereignty over those waters  we claim in the High Arctic.
[4] However, this does nothing to thwart trespassing by foreign surface ships. As Professors Michael Byers and Rob Huebert both noted in the Globe & Mail on 23 Dec. 2005, the greatest challenge in Arctic waters comes not from submarines, but rather from ensuring that increased civilian shipping traffic (encouraged by global warming)  will not  ignore Canadian environmental  laws and  maritime regulations.
Dianne  DeMille  is  the  editor  of  the  Canadian  American  Strategic  Review.
Stephen Priestley is the creator of  DND 101 - A Visual Guide to CF Equipment .


<   Part 2  —  Proposed Armed Heavy Icebreakers & Iqaluit Docking Facilities
>   Part 4  —  UAVs:  a Display of MALEness?