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Defence Policy  –  Conservative Party  –  December 2005

Stephen Harper announces the new defence policy
put forward by the Conservative Party of Canada – Sidebar


Dianne DeMille & Stephen Priestley  –  this article has been expanded from
'briefing  notes'  prepared  by  CASR  for  the  CBC  on  22  December  2005

Sidebar: Armed Icebreakers, Conversion Opportunities, and Serious Intentions

The Conservative plan calls for newly designed armed naval icebreakers within five years. Were conversions of existing vessels undertaken, an armed icebreaker could be in the Arctic within a year.  But what are our options?  Canada’s fleet of Arctic-capable icebreakers is aged and over- worked. The largest are over-extended, [2] leaving Medium Gulf-River icebreakers.

As mentioned, one Medium Gulf-River icebreaker was standing idle – CCGS Sir John Franklin. Realistically, this Class 3 icebreaker could operate in Arctic ice only in the summer. But, still a vast improvement over thin- hulled Halifax-class frigates. Moreover, the Franklin was surplus to CCG requirements for most of the ’90s. Where was the sense of urgency among politicians in 1993? No-one was mentioning armed icebreakers then.

Let’s run a thought experiment: what would be involved in converting an existing icebreaker? Ironically, it is the Danes that have shown the way. Their Thetis class frigates are of Standard Flex design (ie: weapons and other systems are modular). That same concept could be applied to any conversion. In other words, not only could the 76mm gun and fire control system (from the then laid-up HMCS Huron) have been fitted,  such bellicose items could be easily removed again as required.



But neither the Canadian Alliance nor Progressive Conservatives were promoting armed icebreakers in the ’90s. Instead, the Canadian Arctic Shelf Exchange Study at the University of Laval  successfully argued that the Franklin be converted as an Arctic research vessel. This was completed in 2003 and the vessel rechristened CCGS Amundsen. Rather than an opportunity lost, CASES argues that scientific research in the Arctic is asserting Canadian sovereignty. They have a good point – a regular presence does more  for sovereignty  than occassional armed patrols.  However, as the Danes show, these two roles are not mutually exclusive.[3] Yet this opportunity was not seized during the Franklin’s extensive rebuild. With its absense of interim solutions, this Conservative plan seems half-hearted at best.

[Also see CASR  In Detail  Breaking the Ice: Planning an Iqaluit Deep Water Port for a comparison/rough costing of proposed Canadian Heavy Armed Icebreakers.]


[2] The Canadian Coast Guard’ two largest ships  ( CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent and Terry Fox) are Class 1 icebreakers capable of “extended season operations” in the Arctic. But as the name suggests, the primary role of these Heavy Gulf icebreakers is to keep the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and its Atlantic approaches, open for shipping.
[3] As part of the rebuild for Franklin, two large cranes were added forward.  The cranes on the Danish Thetis class are modular and can be replaced with weaponry within an hour. A rebuilt, dual-purpose Franklin would’ve had more options. The beam of the icebreaker is almost twice that of Huron. Plug-in modules would allow 76mm gun and two small cranes or heavy-duty cranes with the armament removed.


<   Part 2  —  Proposed Armed Heavy Icebreakers & Iqaluit Docking Facilities
>   Part 3  —  Listening In:  the Proposed “Arctic National Sensor System”