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Gen Rick Hillier – Canada First Defence Plan – Updated Version – July 2008 Streamlined, Integrated, and
Effective — How [did] 
[Ed: This column was published in 2005.
Three years later, Canada has lost the best Chief of Defence Staff
in living memory. However, General Hillier did manage
to remake the image of the CF,
in the eyes of all Canadian citizens – left, right,
and centre. More importantly, he managed to revive
the CF's image as a serious fighting force.
The CF still face the serious deficiencies outlined by General Hillier. The new
Canada First defence plan
has capped defence funds.
The path to an effective CF will now require redoubled efforts and
ingenuity – in lieu of any systematic
capital investment in required equipment and training.]Whenever the Canadian government underwrites any expensive military operation, leaders are looking for two kinds of political pay-off – international and domestic. The politicians and bureaucrats who control the purse strings want the Canadian Forces (CF) to be 'seen' in the trouble spots of the world. The Defence Review and General Rick Hillier – Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) In a Canadian Press article, dated 27 January 2005, Stephen Thorne, a consistent chronicler of the ongoing 'defence review', reported that a kind of consensus was emerging on the Hill. Politicians and bureaucrats from Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and CIDA are leaning towards a rapidly deployable, expeditionary force that is 'light-weight', highly mobile, and self-contained. Just before Christmas 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin and Defence Minister Bill Graham agreed that LGen Rick Hillier would become the next Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This appointment is significant. It means that both Martin and Graham believe Hillier is capable of helping develop and implement a new defence policy, strategic plan, and structure for the Canadian Forces. Most importantly, they believe that this new military plan will be consistent with the new central pillar of Canada's foreign policy – the 'responsibility to protect'. Military intervention may be required, if a state fails to protect its own citizens. Martin and Graham wanted to see a military leadership capable of responding, in concert with like-minded nations, in a manner that is precisely tailored to the specific goals of any humanitarian or other form of military intervention. Each operation will be different, because each ' failed state ' will fall apart in its own particular way. By great good fortune, this foreign policy requires exactly the kind of Army that Hillier has been trying to construct during his time as Chief of Land Staff (CLS) – rapidly deployable, agile, capable of speedily gathering intelligence, quick to transmit and integrate that information, always aware of the key elements in the 'battlespace', tactically nimble, and able to fight in any environment. That is the kind of Army that Hillier was shaping. Now, it will be the kind of Canadian Forces he will want to be able to draw upon. The question is: What will the new CDS need, in the way of personnel and equipment, to bring about this new CF? General Rick Hillier puts the emphasis on recruiting new CF Personnel Hillier never gives a speech without mentioning the ordinary men and women of the Canadian Forces. This is not just PR spin – it reflects a practical reality. Of all the highly specialized equipment that Canada puts in the field, the trained soldier/ pilot/ sailor is the most valuable and irreplaceable. Hillier wants to go hard on recruiting, both for regular forces and for reservists. He knows that maintaining a high tempo of missions requiring rapid deployment will depend on having well-trained, well-prepared reservists at the ready. A substantial fraction of competent reservists included in each mission will allow regular-forces personnel to take some 'down time', as needed, between rotations. The readiness of reservists, in turn, will require legislation, similar to that in the US, that gives job guarantees to all those in the Reserves who are called to duty, whether for training or for overseas deployment. General Hillier wants to acquire highly mobile vehicles for expeditionary missions For any expeditionary force, land equipment must be mobile, transportable and fast- moving. That means no more tanks. Hillier was a tanker. He loves tanks. But he has come to realize that these heavy, tracked vehicles are no longer giving the CF 'value-for-money'. [ See Update below.] On 29 October 2003, Hillier and then-Defence Minister John McCallum announced the procurement of the Mobile Gun System (MGS), a variant of the eight-wheeled LAV III (Light Armoured Vehicle). The gnashing of teeth over this decision has not ceased to this day. But Hillier has made his choice. The Mobile Gun System is actually one of a trio of 'fire support' vehicles, which also includes two missile- launchers – the LAV TUA and the MMEV (or 'Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle'). All three of these vehicles are based on the Army's LAV III infantry section carrier. [Update: by mid-2006, officialdom had cooled considerably on both MGS and MMEV (MGS was a rider on US Army orders for M1028 Stryker MGS, MMEV was a distinct DND project ). Land Staff recommended dropping both projects. The need for direct fire support in Afghanistan led to Leopard C2s deployed and Leopard 2s procured. ] The controversial MGS was originally developed for the special requirements of the US Army's highly mobile Stryker Brigades. Both the LAV TUA and MMEV missile launchers are based on existing Canadian Forces weapons systems – the tracked M113-based TUA and ADATS – but placed on the new, wheeled chassis. These new systems will be faster than the older tracked versions. More importantly, they need no heavy transport trailers to deploy them. LAVs can be driven to where the action is – they don't need to be dragged. The US Defense Department has been very impressed with another Canadian LAV, the reconnaissance Coyote, and asked Canada to bring our Coyotes to Afghanistan. If we had joined the 'intervention' in Iraq, our Coyotes would have been asked along as well. The capabilities of the Coyote fit well with Hillier's emphasis on 'situational awareness' of the 'battlespace'. Serving a complementary function is the artillery's surveillance and targeting drone, the Tactical UAV. Sensor information from the TUAV and the Coyote are meant to be integrated. This sensor data, along with rapid information processing and exchange, will allow for effective command, tactical manoeuvring, and a real reduction in the 'fog of war'. The trials and tribulations of the Sperwer TUAVs in Afghanistan were well-covered in the press. Gen Hillier plans to appoint a senior officer to take charge of the TUAV project. The valuable information that can be gathered by these drones is worth giving them another go. Hillier has specific requirements for new Air Force Assets For sovereignty patrols, the Canadian Forces already has upgraded versions of the CF-18, an interceptor, and the CP-140 Aurora, specialized for maritime surveillance. But Hillier will also be looking for air force assets that can play an important role in overseas deployments. (He'll need new helicopters of varying sizes for various roles, but this topic is too big to explore in this column.) The CC-130 Hercules is a tactical airlifter best suited to moving Canadian Forces personnel and equipment from one location to another within the region of conflict. But Canada's Hercules fleet is in bad shape. Early models need to be replaced now – ideally with new 'J' models. [Update: a move towards the C-130J Hercules was inevitable. In November 2005, the then-Liberal government moved to sole-source C-130Js from Lockheed Martin. This was halted by the newly-elected Conservatives who also wanted C-130Js but in open competition. In December 2007, the Harper Tories signed the contract for 17 C-130Js.] The CF's CC-150 Polaris 'strategic' airlifter has a longer range than the Hercules, but these converted Airbus jetliners are only suitable for moving troops and light freight. Furthermore, the CC-150 can only land where undamaged airports are available. Any rapidly deployable expeditionary force needs a proper military-style, long-range strategic airlifter, with some degree of 'rough-field' performance. The US Boeing C-17 is an excellent aircraft, but alas, the price tag puts it out of our range. Hillier has said that he intends to stop the practice of endlessly studying systems that DND cannot possibly afford. [Update: the Harper government single-sourced the Boeing C-17 in any case. In July 2006, a MERX Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN) was published announcing their intention to order four C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters from Boeing.] In the past, the CF has leased strategic airlifters. Enormous Antonov An-124s were leased for the recent DART deployment. This is one solution to the problem, but there are other airlift options available. In past articles, we have recommended that DND purchase a handful of new or refurbished Ilyushin IL-76s. Other authors have proposed long-term leases of these Ilyushin airlifters. [NB: Assured-service lease arrangements are the most cost-effective solution to CF strategic airlift. However, the government was determined to purchase Boeing C-17s.] If the CF is to participate in multinational operations intended to prevent genocide, re-establish the stability in volatile regions, or protect the citizens of 'failed states', strategic airlift presents a conundrum that must be resolved. Hillier's integrated force will need numerous new Seagoing Vessels For sovereignty patrol, four of the Navy's frigates are quite capable of securing the outer edges of Canada's 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones. For monitoring waters closer in, smaller offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are being considered. Again, Hillier will be looking for sea-based assets that can support an overseas deployment. The Navy has an idea for a Joint Support Ship (JSS) at a cost of more than $2 billion. This misguided JSS project attempts to combine the job of transporting the army overseas with myriad other roles, including carrying huge quantities of fuel. The cumbersome JSS is unlikely to fit in with Hillier's planned timeline or budget. This oversized project will likely be broken down into separate, more affordable ventures. For example, a smaller-hulled, dedicated vessel can satisfy the Navy's requirement for replenishment-at-sea (RAS or standard AOR, Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment) ships. [Update: the Harper government went ahead with the ill-considered JSS in June 2006. The OPV concept was eclipsed by the Conservative plan to use ice-hardened Arctic patrol ships (AOPS) as OPVs off Canada’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts in the winter.] On the other hand, delivering the Army and its heavy equipment (eg, large engineering vehicles for reconstruction projects) needs Roll On/Roll Off transport vessels. The US Army already has RO/RO ships in service – TSV Theater Support Vessels. This catamaran is much faster than the JSS and will present a much smaller target in any combat zone. Hillier's new, more coherent, more highly integrated strategic plan will require, as a first step, the reallocation of funds recommended by former defence minister, John McCallum. But even striking some of the high-priced 'fantasy' projects off the DND shopping-list might not free up enough cash for the force structure desired. An effective expeditionary force, with highly trained, specialized personnel, along with the appropriate support from air and maritime commands, will likely require an increase in defence spending. The prime minister has already said that he would be open to an increase in the defence budget – once General Hillier is Chief. Perhaps Martin feels reassured that, for the first time in living memory, Canadian defence policy (and spending priorities) will reflect both the foreign policy of this country and the expectations of its citizens. * Published 27 January 2005. 'View from the West' is a special feature section of the Winnipeg Free Press. This CASR version has been updated to take account of recent developments. Dianne DeMille is the editor of CASR. Stephen Priestley is the researcher/illustrator. |