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CASR
Canadian American
Strategic Review
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- Canadian Defence Policy, Foreign
Policy, & Canada-US Relations - |
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Afghan Mission – New US Troops –
2011 Pull-Out – NATO~ISAF – December 2009
Summer 2011 Pull-Out –
Downward Ramp – Not a Cliff :
Parliament Should Re-Think the CF Exit from Kandahar
Comments by a journalist on the performance of CF troops in the Arghandab Valley [1]
On 13 December 2009, David
Pugliese provided a link to a
report on the battles for the
Arghandab River Valley (ARV)
to the northwest of Kandahar
City. The author makes some
rather unfortunate comments
about the Canadian Forces:
[CF] "made jabs at Arghandab
but did not get far. Some
people believe [that] the [CF]
have been militarily defeated
... No US officer has told me that
the [CF] have been defeated,
and none have denied it. "
This comment could be described as 'innuendo'. No pious follow-up
remarks about the number of CF casualties can erase the lack of respect reflected in
this ill-informed comment.
If there is some humiliation to be borne in the conduct of the Afghan Mission, especially in the south
around Kandahar, let it be borne by us – the Canadian citizens and our Parliament. Deployed
CF troops have done their best, often in the absence
of effective, consistent support from their own government.
Now, at last, the chief of NATO-ISAF, US General Stanley McChrystal, has recognized that Kandahar City is
a key stronghold. NATO forces must hold the City and its environs, if they are to push back the
Taliban insurgency. Thousands of US troops are going to be deployed in the Arghandab River Valley (ARV).
Thousands more are already assembling to the south of Kandahar City,
forming a security perimeter, in order to protect the civilian population.
These NATO-ISAF troops will need the intel of experienced Canadian Forces personnel who have been deployed
in and around Kandahar for four years. Now is the chance for NATO troops to work
together in Kandahar Province as was originally intended. It is also a chance for Canadian Forces
to demonstrate what they are capable of when they are able to work under optimal conditions.
The Canadian Parliament owes it to our troops to make the announced summer 2011 pull-out more flexible.
In fact, the most logical pull-out date, from a military perspective,
would be one that
is consistent with the 2011 'draw-down' that has been announced by NATO-ISAF.
This date has been described as a ' downward ramp
– not a cliff. ' [2]
By altering the CF withdrawal and aligning our timing with that of NATO-ISAF, our troops would be spared the
kind of casual, demoralizing remarks exemplified in the article cited above.
A similar flexibility will likely be demonstrated by our allies during
the NATO meeting
in January 2010. It is probable that
the Dutch and the Australians will stay on in Uruzgan Province.
Likewise, British and Danish Forces will likely remain in
Helmand Province.
(The Helmand River is downstream from the Arghandab. The Taliban use these river valleys to move north and south
with less chance of detection.)
With their experience in Kandahar Province, Canadian Forces could make a real difference
to the concerted military effort in southern Afghanistan. Parliament should think hard about the impact on the morale of
our troops, and on those of other nations, if Canada pulls out according to
some arbitrary deadline, instead of considering the overall effect of our exit –
on our troops, on those of our allies, and on the attitude of the enemy
towards the West.
[1] Article title: Arghandab & The Battle for Kandahar written
by Michael Yon.
[2] This highly visual analogy has been attributed to
General James Jones, National Security Advisor
to US President Barack Obama.
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