CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
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Afghan National Army - Army Recruiting - Military Pay   –   November  2006 Only a Strong Afghan National Army can secure Afghanistan A Point of View from an Afghan writer and military historian Dr.  Assem  Akram,  an  Afghan  historian  currently  living  in  the  US * Five years have passed since the American-led  inter- vention in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime. Yet, the security situation  in  that country is  far from improved.  In fact, it has worsened.  Iraqi-style suicide bombs have become a daily occurrence.  Rather  than subsiding, the threat from the Taliban and  Al  Qaeda has only  gained  momentum,  especially in the  south. Today, vast areas of Afghanistan lie outside the control of the ineffectual admin- istration of  President  Hamid Karzai  in Kabul.  The United States  is passing  the baton to NATO, asking Canada and European countries to pacify the 'rebellious' southern provinces of Afghanistan. Is this strategy working? Are foreign troops the solution to Afghanistan's security problem? What  have  the  international  forces  achieved  during  the  last  five  years? The more than  $ 16 billion of  international  assistance  has barely affected  the lives of  the majority of  Afghans living outside of main cities.  Even in  Kabul,  it's  hard to see any dramatic  improvement.  Electric power  is scant.  The trash is  seldom  collected.  Slums  and   'improvised  settlements' for the returning refugees are growing,  and the problem  is not being addressed.  Rampant  corruption  of  government officials  causes  desperation  among  the ordinary  citizens of  Kabul.  In addition, the city is increasingly the scene of car bombings. They target foreign troops, but they kill scores of  Afghan civilians. Foreign troops in Afghanistan  –  no matter what their nationality may be, or their composition, or  even  their overall intentions  –  all  respond  to a simple principle. Pressure applied  by any foreign troops will cause an 'equal and opposite reaction' among members of the local population.  In other words,  the more  foreign  troops that are sent  into  the Afghan  provinces  (in order  to  suppress  the  insurgency) the  more  favourable  those  forces  make  the  conditions  for  the  insurgents  to recruit the local people to their cause.  And the  insurgency  grows  ever  stronger. Has  intervention  been  recognized  as  a  failure  by  the  United  States? The Bush  Administration  is  bringing in  NATO countries  –   especially  the UK and  Canada  –  to  do  the  dirty  work  of  eliminating  the  Taliban  threat,  while it  turns  its  attention  (and  its  military  efforts)  towards  the  quagmire  in  Iraq. Foreign  troops  in  Afghanistan are not part of the  solution,  but  part of  the  problem.  These troops attract  foreign  militants.  Most  suicide bombers are  non - Afghans,  keen  to confront 'the West',  which is viewed as a  global enemy. These bombers flock over the Pakistani border. But once this focal point  –   ie,  the  presence of  foreign  troops  –  is removed, Afghanistan will be a less attractive battleground. The local Afghan population will  be  less  inclined  to  sympathize  with  the  Islamicist  extremists,  and  also less likely to turn a blind eye to the destabilizing  activities of  these insurgents. Can  there  be a  home - grown  solution  to  Afghanistan's  security  problems? After  five  years,  it  should  be  apparent  to  any  observer  that  the  continued and  growing  presence  of  foreign  troops  on  Afghan  soil  simply  encourages an  ad hoc  nexus of  the Taliban  and  other  non-Afghan  militants  to  'ramp  up' their  concerted  struggle  against  their  common  enemy:  the  'Western  infidels'. It is the basic duty of any government  to provide security for its citizens and  to defend  its borders against foreign aggression.  It is essential that the Afghan government  deploy, as soon as  possible, its own appropriately-sized, fully functioning, and, above all, well-equipped  National  Army.  Despite repeated  promises  –  by Hamid Karzai, by the US, and by ISAF  –  no such  army  has  been  created. The problems of Afghanistan must be solved by the Afghan people themselves. Therefore,  my  recommendations  for  the  Karzai  government  ( and  for  those  member-states  which  are  currently  involved  in  Afghanistan )  are as  follows:       •   Make the build-up of a robust Afghan National Army  (ANA)           the top priority of your agenda.       •   Build  up  an  army  of  150,000  to  175,000  men  within  six  months.           ( Fill in the ranks first, worry about training and integration later.           There are hundreds of thousands of jobless former soldiers and           Mujaheddin fighters who need just a few real incentives to enlist. )       •  Create a seven-member advisory board made up of retired           Afghan army generals and a couple of  former top-tier           Mujaheddin commanders to lend experience to the process.       •   Draw down  US,  NATO, and other foreign forces in Afghanistan.           The  International  Security  Assistance  Force  (ISAF)           should be reduced to a UN-mandated peace & disarmament           monitoring presence of a few hundred men.       •   In the long term, the International Community should maintain ties           with the ANA,  providing these local forces with thorough training,           appropriate modern equipment, and help with logistics management. Security  in  Afghanistan  cannot  be  separated  from  regional  security If members of the International Community are truly concerned about the security of  Afghanistan,  they  should   put   intense   pressure  on   Pakistan  to  clean  up the  tribal  areas –  Baluchistan,  Waziristan,  and  the North-West  Frontier Province.  Islamabad  has  been insincere  and  uncooperative  for  too  long.   Only a sustained and credible threat  from  the  US,  the  UK and other  influential  nations  can  force  Pakistan  to switch  gears.  'Parleys' at  the White  House  will  not serve  to  change  Pakistan's  deeply  institutionalized laisser  faire policy  towards  these three tribal  areas. Without security  for Afghanistan,  there can be  no stability, no reconstruction,  no education,  no human rights  ( let alone women's rights ),  no investment, no development, no growth. A prolonged  presence of  foreign troops  in Afghanistan will not improve security. To the contrary,  the presence of  these troops aggravates  the  insecurity  felt by  the Afghan people. It is,  therefore, essential  for all nations involved in Afghanistan, and for all those who sincerely wish  to  see  the  people  of  that  country  return  to  a normal life, to  concentrate  their  efforts  on  only  one  goal:  a  robust,  sizable,  and  visible Afghan  National  Army  (ANA), capable of  maintaining security  throughout all the Afghan provinces, and shoring up  the authority of  the  central  government. * This article was first published in The Afghan Observer, an online newsletter.    For  background  information  on  Dr.  Akram,   please  see:  Author  Bio