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Afghan Mission  –  Training  ANA  –  Military  Mentors  –  September  2007

Training  and  Equipping  the  Afghan  Security  Forces
Tools,  Tactics,  and  Technology —  Part  1 :  The  ANA

Edited  excerpts  –   Parliament's  Standing  Committee  on  National  Defence
Recommendation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defence
The Canadian government should increase the [CF] Canadian Forces  contribution  to  [ the training and equipping ] of  the  Afghan  National  Army  [ANA] so that  as  the [ capabilities  of  the ANA  develop ] higher level  collective training...can  be conducted prior  to  real  operations.   [ Emphasis  added ]
NATO~ISAF  assists  ANA  officers  at  the  Kabul  Military  Training  Center

 ISAF  personnel  train  Afghan  military  instructors,  who,  in turn,  train  their  own  soldiers.  ISAF  staff  and  ANA  instructors  work  under  the  US  forces  at  the   Kabul  Military  Training  Centre  [ KMTC ].  In  addition   to  the  majority  American  contingent,  there  are  sixty  British  troops ,  along  with  smaller detachments of  Romanian,  Mongolian,  and  French soldiers.  Fifteen  (15)  Canadian Forces  [CF]  personnel  also serve at the  KMTC.

The  US  directs  the  basic  and  advanced  training  of enlisted recruits and  trains NCOs  (non-commissioned officers)  for  most  basic  training  courses.  Under  the Officer  Training   Brigade ,  a   French   Army  advisory team  oversees  the  training  of  officers  for  low - level field  command. [ See right. ]  At  the  Officer  Candidate School,  the UK  directs  basic  infantry officer  training. In a separate  training brigade,  the  UK  also  conducts initial and advanced non-commissioned officer training.

At  KMTC,  CF  personnel  supervise  the  Combined  Training  Exercise  portion of  initial  military  training.  Trainee  soldiers,  NCOs,  and  officers  are  brought together in field training  exercises to certify  them as  ready  for field operations. Ideally,  these  exercises  would  be  held  at  the  kandak  (battalion)  level,  but the  ANA  is  simply  not  yet  able  to  perform  at  that  level.

 At  any  one time,  KMTC  has  about  2500  Afghan  soldiers under training.  It  graduates  a  615 - person  kandak  every  month.  It  takes  sixteen  ( 16 )  weeks  to turn an Afghan  recruit  into a  well-trained  soldier.  Once  trained,  ANA  forces  leave  Kabul,  joining  the  Regional  Corps  deployed  throughout  the  provinces.  ANA  kandaks  are aided by  ISAF  military  personnel  called  Operational  Mentor  Liaison Teams  ( OMLTs ).  The omelettes  (as they're called)  advise  commanders on  intelligence,  communications,  fire  support,  logistics,  and  infantry  tactics.

Canada provides a 64-man OMLT in Kandahar Province, which recently took over responsibility  for  supporting  an entire  ANA Brigade.  As  the size of  the  ANA grows,  and  more  kandaks  are  deployed  in  the  Kandahar area,  Canada  could provide valuable help by increasing the number and size of the Canadian OMLTs.

The  Committee  visited  Kandahar  to  assess  the  progress  of  the  local  ANA

The information presented here was all anecdotal, but it provided  the Committee with  a  better  feel  for  the  circumstances [ faced  by  the  CF  military  mentors ]. In the end,  the Committee came away with a more realistic  understanding of  the difficulties  prevalent  in  developing  an  effective  ANA.

For example, soldiers are recruited from all nine ethnic groups across the country and  will  spend  their  full  three-year  tour  of  duty  on  operational  deployment. Some  simply  grow  tired of  being  away  from home,  for  perhaps  the  first  time in  their  lives.  Once  paid ,  some  just  take  their  money  back  to  their  families, with  no  real  concept  of  their  'professional'  military  responsibilities.

Good  armies  [ with a strong  sense of  duty to  their  nation state ]  are  not  built overnight.  When  the  ANA  can  stand  on  its  own,  all  foreign  military  forces can  go  home.  The  Committee  believes  that  a  fully - trained   Afghan   Army , an  Army  that  can  defend  its  own  country,  is  essentially  our  ' exit  strategy '.
Excerpt from item on CBC News  –  19 May 07

The  Afghan  National  Army  [ANA]  has  had high  desertion  rates,  as  young  men  join  up, lose interest, and  then simply go home.  Not so in the  formation  mentored  by  the CF [ which ] has  had  the  lowest  absentee  rate of  any unit. General Khan Mohammad, the ANA commander in Kandahar province,  said his soldiers were so impressed by  the 'work ethic' of  the Canadians, that  it  was  beginning  to  rub  off  on  his  men.

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