CASR

Canadian
American
Strategic
Review

Afghanistan  –  Canada and  ISAF  under  NATO  –  July 2004 Afghanistan:  the Silk Road  to  Riches? Jeff  Borsato  –  Freelance  Journalist  with  a  background  in  History International Commitment to Afghanistan  –  How Durable? In May 2004, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sponsored a regional conference entitled,  Afghanistan's  Regional  Economic  Cooperation: Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan.  Just prior to this conference,  Afghan Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani,  published an article in the International Herald Tribune (10 May 2004). He spoke with optimism about the opportunities for neighbouring nations if Afghanistan itself became an open, economically stable nation-state: "With increasing stability and, we hope, increasing investments in roads, railways and air routes, bankers and entrepreneurs from Iran and Pakistan can trade, not only with Afghanistan, but with all of Central Asia's republics." Mr. Ghani went on to note the importance of the US $  8.2  billion which had been pledged by donor nations in Berlin (April 2004).  These funds were earmarked for Afghanistan's  reconstruction.  It was a sound  investment,  he said, because a stable Afghanistan would become a 'land bridge' for regional north-south trade. Afghanistan's Closest Neighbours Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan in the south and east, Iran in the southwest, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the northwest, with Tajikistan and China in the northeast. Among these nations, Iran and Pakistan are the most influential. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Afghans make up one of the largest fractions of the asylum-seekers in the world. Most of these Afghan refugees live in Iran and Pakistan. Iran's long-term relationship with Afghanistan Iran, named a member of the infamous 'Axis of Evil' by the Bush Administration, has both the money and the desire to contribute to Afghanistan's development. However, Iran's tenuous hold on democracy serves as a poor example for Afghanistan’s long-term vision of its future, and the short-term goal of holding elections this fall. Iran has been accused by the United States of harbouring Al-Qaeda fugitives fleeing Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. The US has reiterated concerns regarding Iran's 'neutrality' on the US-led war against terrorism. Meanwhile, Iran has established military links with North Korea, Russia and China. Yet despite this, Tehran was an active supporter of the Northern Alliance before 11 September 2001, seeking to prevent a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on its eastern border. In addition, there remain lasting ties between Iran and Afghanistan due to the asylum that Iran has provided to so many Afghans fleeing the war. Some officials within the Afghanistan Transitional Authority charge that Iran is supporting various tribal warlords in an attempt to manipulate the elections. But Iranian leaders claim that their only official policy is to offer diplomatic ties. These ties will, they say, serve a crucial role in ensuring the political stability of the region, and promoting trade among all the countries of Central Asia. Pakistan's influence on the future of Afghanistan Pakistan is perhaps the most significant factor in Afghanistan's future stability and economic prosperity. The former CIA chief responsible for monitoring Pakistan, Milt Bearden, has noted that the US-led Operation Mountain Storm, begun on 7 March 2004, was designed to root out militants and Al-Qaeda operatives who had taken refuge in the mountainous border frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In his numerous articles and interviews, Bearden has recalled the experiences of Alexander the Great, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union. They all endured a wholly unsatisfying mixture of 'ambiguous' victories and outright defeat against the tribal peoples of Afghanistan. Bearden predicts that the US and NATO will experience the same degree of frustration. The western provinces of Pakistan and the adjacent regions of Afghanistan comprise the tribal lands of the Pashtuns. Their tribal allegiance to one another supercedes any national boundaries. Their traditional lands include the border region just southeast of Kabul – the Shah-i-Kot/Tora Bora region, along with larger areas further to the south. If this border could be tightly controlled, it would help to reduce the flow of illegal goods, insurgents, and weapons in both directions. Unfortunately, it would also hamper any legal trade across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. For the United States, perhaps the immediate goal of gaining a military foothold in this region is of higher priority than cross-border trade.  The US will be putting great pressure on Pakistan to adopt the same priorities. Pakistan's Western Provinces  –  Haven for Fundamentalism? In order for Afghanistan to ensure a sustainable economy for its people, its trading partners must cooperate to maintain peace and stability in the region, both domestic and international. The forces of destabilization could be intensified by Pakistan's influence. Pakistan's Muslim clergy has been accused by President Hamid Karzai of supporting pro-Taliban activity. Many of Pakistan's madrassas, or religious schools, are traditional breeding grounds for militancy and recruitment to Islamic fundamentalist groups. The Mattahida Majlis-E-Amal (MMA) is a group of six Islamist parties. It has grown into a powerful faction within Pakistan, and brokers support for the Taliban. The group promotes radical Muslim instruction for young boys. Their stronghold is Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. Pashtun ties allow them to exert great influence in the area of Afghanistan just over the border. A recent wave of anti-US sentiment in Pakistan has seen a growth spurt of such radical Islamist groups, a dangerous prospect in a nuclear nation with over forty percent unemployment. A fall from grace for Pakistan would not only threaten a key strategic ally of the US but also encroach on Afghanistan's delicate stability. Opium is still Afghanistan's Chief Cash Crop At present, over half of Afghanistan's national income  is  derived  from  the  cultivation  and trafficking of opium. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime  (ODC)  notes that, in 2003, around 3,600 tonnes of opium were grown on about 80,000 hectares of land, a large increase over 2002 estimates. The ODC has suggested that Afghanistan's 'drug economy' is one of the major threats to the development of a stable democracy and  future economic growth. Opium Trade Supports the Warlords and their Militias The personnel attached to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), operating outside of Kabul, see first hand the dynamics of the opium trade in the far-flung provinces where warlords and armed militiamen have long held sway. Throughout Afghanistan are farms consisting of marginal soil  –  good for growing opium poppies, but little else. It would be difficult to turn these lands into fields that can support other cash crops, or the staple food supplies needed by farmers and their families. Instead, the farmers simply sell their opium to the warlords, who then find ready customers. In the global marketplace,  this is a popular  (and highly lucrative) commodity. The Ongoing Power of Warlords Warlords are still active throughout Afghanistan. Their  de facto  political  and economic power must be taken into account by the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA)  and  by  the  international  community.  Can  these  warlords  and  their militiamen ever agree to submit to a central government?  Can elected officials let warlord-led groups retain some degree of local authority?  What concessions will need to be made to allow for an acceptable level of tribal autonomy? The presence  of  dissenting  tribal  warlords  and  their armed  militiamen  is, by no means, a  feature unique  to Afghanistan.  Many  nations  in the Central and  South Asian region are comprised of  factions  having strong traditional  clan  loyalties,  especially  in  the  provincial areas  outside of  the cities and towns. Any opposition by  these  traditional  warlords  to  a  centralized,  urban authority should  not  be  taken  as  a  sign  of  political failure on  the  part of  the  interim  government,  nor on the  part  of  NATO  and  the  international  community. Tribalism  is  a  deeply  complex  issue  requiring  a  continual  effort  to  find  some acceptable form of compromise.  [Canadians  are  familiar  with  the  difficulty  of balancing the authority of a centralized government with the desire for autonomy voiced  by  provinces  which  are  geographically  distant  or  culturally  distinct.] When is it Justified to use Force to Impose Central Authority? President  Karzai,  NATO,  ISAF  and  the United  Nations  are  facing a  recurring historical dilemma: Does the Central Authority seek some resolution of differences by allowing opposition groups  (including  tribal  warlords  backed  up  by  loyal armed militiamen, in the case of Afghanistan)  to  be  recognized  as  constituents of  the nation's new government?   Or, for the sake  of  'national unity',  does  the Central  Authority  use  force  to suppress  opposition,  in  order  to prevent  any provincial uprisings and other armed challenges to the newly elected government? Reconstruction of Afghan Infrastructure and Upcoming Elections By far the greatest difficulty facing the interim government  of  President  Hamid  Karzai  is Afghanistan's  lack  of  'civic'  infrastructure. There is international support for building and staffing new schools to encourage education of both children and women. Access to education was severely curtailed under the Taliban regime. At the same time, however, the overall quality of life for women and children was undermined by the Taliban because of inadequate health care, unsafe drinking water, and poor access to the few public resources that were available. Under these ongoing conditions it is difficult to set education as the primary communal priority.  A  book,  to a  person  who  is starving  or  freezing,  is  kindling  first  –  knowledge  second. Transitional president, Hamid Karzai, has recently announced that elections, both presidential and parliamentary,  will take place in September 2004.  Registration of voters by the central government,  helped by officials of  the United Nations,  has been slow.  The  registration is being carried out  with special attention to women, encouraging  them to participate in a process from  which  they  have been barred for so long.  Convincing the citizens of Afghanistan to vote so soon after the fall of  the Taliban  is  no easy  task. What can Canada and other NATO countries do to help support Afghanistan? As  interim president, Karzai is desperately seeking to create a greater sense of unity in the country, by manoeuvering to concentrate political power at the centre, by working to build up the perceived 'legitimacy' of the Kabul government, and by garnering as much international support as possible. In order for Afghanistan to achieve lasting legitimacy in the world of nations, it must successfully establish a democratically elected government which can both enforce the rule of law and oversee sound economic development. What role can Canada,  European  NATO countries, and  ISAF  (the  International Security  Assistance  Force  –  currently  under  the  command  of  Canada)  play in the struggle to provide the people of Afghanistan with both political and economic independence? Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) One option favoured by a number of both NATO and non-NATO countries is the setting  up  of  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams.  PRTs  are  comprised  of  both military  and  civilian  components,  with  the  goal  of  enhancing  local  security. Several PRTs have already been set up by various nations [including tiny New Zealand – see left]. Canada is currently considering either establishing a PRT of its own, or taking over a PRT already established by one of the other nations. PRTs are intended to fulfill three vital components  of  Afghanistan's  future development:  democratic  institutions, sustainable  infrastructure,  and  stable economic 'engines'  for  future growth. Economic development will thrive only if  transport, trade, and security can thrive. The central Afghan government requires the help of the international community in creating  and  enhancing  its  civilian  infrastructure. This will have a dual effect: greater access  for all  Afghans  to  clean  water, to  medical  services,  and  to  the centres of commerce, along with an increase in the overall economic development and political stability of the country. Will Canada stay Focused on the Economic and Security Needs of Afghanistan? Can  Afghanistan  achieve  the  success  towards which  the  international community has invested so much time and effort?  So far, Afghanistan has done well, despite ongoing threats by pro-Taliban neighbours and the diplomatic chess board that is Central Asia. Along with elections this fall, what is required most are continued reconstruction teams, or PRTs, and the ongoing stabilization efforts of ISAF under NATO control. Tragically, the interest of  Canada – and the West – seems to be waning. [Editor's note:  On 29 June 2004,  NATO  leaders  were  meeting  at  Istanbul,  their security protected by over  20,000  riot  police and a  'no-fly  zone' overhead.  Most astonishing,  the  Bosporus  was  closed,  even  to  oil  tanker  traffic.  After  much discussion,  the leaders of the richest,  most powerful nations in the world agreed to  send  another  3500  troops  to  shore  up  ISAF-Kabul's  attempts  to  provide security  for  the  citizens  of  Afghanistan  during  their  September  elections.]