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Afghan National Army  –  Special  Forces  –  Eastern Afghanistan  –  May  2008 Commandos:  The  US  Combined  Security  Transition  Command Trains selected Afghan soldiers to become ' the Best of  the Best ' Edited  excerpts  from  an  article  published  in  The  Christian  Science  Monitor   [1] US  training  of  Afghan  commandos  aims  to  create  an  elite ,  quick - reaction  force  The new Afghan commandos are distinct from the  regular Afghan National Army. They are  trained to  be ' the best of the best ',  who fight in  riskier, more  complex  political  and  military  environments.  For  example,  they might confront a popular tribal leader  aligned with the Taliban. At the same time, they are  expected  to help  define  the image and  abilities of  the Afghan security forces as a whole. It's a crucial  addition  for  an  uneven  US - NATO  mission  that  many military and civilian leaders agree has evolved  in a way  that has allowed  the Taliban  to resurface. Here at this former Soviet training base in the town of Rish Khvor, near Kabul, the company of US Army Special Forces Command in Afghanistan, 3rd Special Forces Group, is giving this band of men a leg up from the common soldiers of the Afghan National Army. Since last year, these Afghans have helped US forces to nab forty (40) of  the most wanted extremist leaders. The emergence of  the 3500-strong commando force, now just a year old, is a natural develop- ment in a country that has seen decades of war. An inherent warrior ethos helps drive these soldiers toward becoming a professional military.  In Iraq, US forces, tasked with the training the Iraqi security forces, often remark that many of  the Iraqi troops don't have the necessary will, or discipline, to become an effective fighting force.  But trainers here in Afghanistan say that they see plenty of will  –  Afghan soldiers simply need to be shown the way. Commandos require oversight, especially when it comes to advanced planning for missions, says the American commander here, who cannot be identified by virtue of his job in Special Forces. Local Afghan forces also need help on the missions themselves, as the commandos have no aircraft to speak of.  [CASR Ed:  The US did provide the Afghan National Army Air Corps with some Mi-8 medium helicopters  also used  by US Special Forces in Afghanistan.] The safe base in  eastern Afghanistan  contrasts with the violence of  southern Afghanistan This training base is  likely  to  become  the permanent home of the commandos.  American officers here hope they can  build  up  the  program  as much as  possible. Unlike the coalition forces training  the regular Afghan National Army,  the  Special Forces expect a  long-term relationship with  this  base as  they seek  to build and then  nurture  the  program.  "We  are sure  these guys won't leave us," says Col. Abdul Jaber,  commander of the battalion or kandak currently undergoing training. Indeed, the base generates a sense of permanence with its neat rows of tin-roofed buildings, clean streets, and the bustle of construction on its far side.  Surrounded  by a tall  chain-link fence,  there is an American side  and an Afghan side,  each with  its own living and working areas.  On the commandos'  side is a big,  black  billboard,  featuring  a  steely - eyed  soldier, reminding the Afghan commandos that they are  ' the best of the best '.  They  will  become a well-equipped,  well-trained, and courageous force  ' to do the dangerous and difficult tasks '. Because of the difficulty of the work the commandos must do compared with the ANA, they receive extra pay,  as well as double  the normal  amount of  food each day  –  an  uncommon perk.  They  have  also  been  given a  unique  18-week  cycle of  operations.   Each  kandak trains  for six  weeks,  then conducts  missions  for six  more,  and then  ' refits  and recovers ' for an additional six weeks,  during which time they may go on leave and  visit  their families. Special  Forces  training  has  translated  into  some  tactical  victories  on  the  battlefield So far,  this training program has turned out four kandaks, of  about 650 commandos each, now assigned permanently to various locations around the country. Two more kandaks are on the way.  The commandos have begun to plan some parts of their own counter-terrorism missions, including a recent operation in the northeastern Afghan province of  Nuristan.  One kandak of Afghan commandos,  helping  Special  Forces operating in  Nuristan,  reportedly  netted  several  members of  the terrorist group,  HIG  (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin).  This  06  April  2008 mission led to a Coalition  airstrike that,  along with the ground  fighting,  left as many as twenty (20)  dead.  The  US  Special  Forces  said  that  the operation  had  reduced  the  ability of  HIG  to operate  in  the area.  Afterwards,  the  Afghan  Ministry of  Defense cited no civilian casualties.[2] Officials  acknowledge  that  more  training  and  equipment  is  needed  to  build  this  force US military officials in Afghanistan admit that getting supplies for this new force continues to be a problem. Bureaucratic red tape, onerous regulations set up by the US  Department of State, and delays in the manufacturing process,  have all contributed to equipment shortages that have handicapped  the  effectiveness of the commando  kandaks. Each kandak, for example, is mandated to have fifty-one Ford Ranger pickup trucks. But each battalion has only 30 or so  [of  these Ranger "Severe Off-Road Vehicles"], American officials here say. While shortages often plague any foreign force, US trainers insist  that  the success of  the commando  program  –  and  its  potential  for a  broader  influence  on the whole  ANA [Afghan National Army]  –  should not be undermined by such bureaucratic supply problems. The US officials acknowledge that some equipment is backordered, but point to the speed at which they have supported the building of the commandos. Indeed, the US has significantly expanded  financial aid to the training and equipping effort  here. The budget for the training command has grown nearly seven times in the past two years, from around $1 billion in fiscal 2005 to about $7 billion in fiscal 2007. Commandos  can  make  a  difference  by  fostering  a  constructive  sense  of  nationalism US trainers  point out  that  it is critical  to build the cohesion of  the commando force, and the Afghan Army as a whole. It is essential that these men,  from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, feel a strong bond. Commandos rely on a creed under which they see themselves as brothers- in-arms,  whether they be Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, or Turkmen.  Within  the  force,  rigid rules  govern  what  is acceptable,  and  what is not.  Politics  falls  under  this  latter  category. Even so,  ethnic differences can  provide acceptable  fodder  for  some  good-natured  ribbing. Sgt.  Mohammed  Akbar  was  supervising  his  squad,  undergoing  the  training  at the shoot house.  One of his group  joked that Akbar  –  a Hazara  whose Asian background is apparent in his facial features  –  had a 'flat nose'. But that's fine with Sergeant Akbar,  a serious soldier- trainer who says the commandos' diversity is their strength. "We're all Afghans," says Akbar, as he stands atop a stack of tires  in the training  building and gestures to  the men below him. [1]   Article written by Gordon Lubold, staff writer of  The Christian Science Monitor,         prepared while stationed in Rish Khvor, Afghanistan. Published on 01 May 2008. [2]   At the same time, Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted a  Nuristan  provincial  lawmaker,         Rahmatullah Rashidi, as saying that  the US - Afghan attack  had  killed several civilians.         Independent sources say that  local leaders have often made similar claims which turned         out to be unfounded.  It is difficult to get accurate, impartial reports of civilian casualties.