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CASR
Canadian American
Strategic Review
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- Canadian Defence Policy, Foreign
Policy, & Canada-US Relations - |
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Armed Naval Icebreakers (A/OPS) – Vessel Capabilities/TSOR – DND
Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship — Proposed Ship Capabilities & Technical Statement of
Operational Requirement Features
Update: (August 2009) According to Murray Brewster of CP, the AOPS
project has now been "postponed indefinitely" pending a new Canadian shipbuilding strategy.
Proposed Ship Capabilities [ from PMO AOPS ]
The following high level draft requirements are presented as an indicative indication of the capabilities required
of the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship. These requirements
will be studied and refined during Project Definition.
The primary characteristics of the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship
(AOPS) are fully inclu- sive of the following capabilities:
1. sufficient flexibility to operate independently and effectively in Canada's Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZ), including such diverse environments as the Canadian
Arctic, the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and off the Northwest coast of
the Queen Charlotte Islands [Haida Gwaii]. The ships would also be capable of navi-
gating the St- Lawrence River on a year round basis and berthing in Quebec City;
2. can operate year-round in medium first year ice which may include old ice inclus- ions as well
as the open ocean areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Canadian EEZ;
3. ice capability exclusively for its own mobility and not to provide icebreaking services to
others;
4. sustain operations for up to four months;
5. range of at least six thousand nautical miles;
6. sufficient organic situational awareness to ensure safety of navigation and flight;
7. sufficient command, control and communication (C3) capability to provide and
receive real-time information to/from the Canadian Forces' Common Operating
Picture (COP);
8. cruise speed of at least 14 knots and a maximum speed of at least 20 knots;
9. gun armament; and
10. remain operational for 25 years beyond Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
Additionally, the AOPS may be required to be capable of embarking and operating, in up to sea state 3, an
on-board organic helicopter, up to and including a CH 148 CYCLONE, with one flying and one maintenance
crew.
Key features of the Draft Technical Statement of Operational
Requirement
[Full TSOR text
available in pdf format for the PMO AOPS]
"limited operational support" for the Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone "sheltering" [ ie:
an enclosed hangar for the helicopter ], onboard maintenance, and refuelling
support 12 person dive team
deck area for 3 x ISO TEU containers [ ie: three 20 foot shipping containers ]
minimum turbulent air flow over flight deck (reason for moving stacks??)
speed not less than 20 kts in sea state 3. Draft 9.5m or less.
enclosed mast with interior access to the top
one small-to-medium calibre gun [ remote controlled and stoppage clearing
but, otherwise, main gun type is not specified. System Requirements Document 728,
(pdf )
mentions calibre, saying between 20mm and 40mm is likely appropriate.]
at least one RCHMG 50-cal Browning [ Remote
Control Heavy Machine Gun ]
tow JSS (Joint Support Ship) at 2 kts in sea state 2
two (diesel-powered waterjet) fast rescue RHIBs 35 kts, self-righting
one fast, fully-enclosed boarding party boats [insertion] 35 kts, 10 man boarding
party [ see Danish Absalon
class for an example of a fast insertion craft ]
one landing craft 15 kts, can carry 10 tonnes and accommodate a Bv206 |
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