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CCV Armoured Vehicles  –  Tactical Requirements  –  October 2009 CCV:  Close Combat Vehicle — Details of Tactical Requirements David Pugliese has published more requirements for the Close Combat Vehicle project. These begin by describing the "deficiencies" of current light armoured vehicles which led to the CCV project.  These LAVs are subjected  to greater anti-armour threats than anticipated, are deployed  for greater durations than expected, and, as a result of over- loading  by add-on armour kits, vehicle performance and durability are both degraded. CASR comments follow CCV details published by David Pugliese reproduced below: What the Canadian Army  is looking for  in its Close Combat Vehicle  [ CCV ] The identified deficiencies that led to this project are:   • Deployed troops are progressively exposed to more severe anti-armour threats.   • Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) are extensively employed on operations, some of     which exceed what they were designed for.   • Add-on protection kits have exceeded LAV designed GVW [Gross Vehicle Weight]     resulting in degraded agility, manoeuvrability, and reliability.   • The overall deficiency can be stated as a lack of capacity to operate in the 'Medium     Armoured Vehicle' [MAV] class range to fill the current capability gap between the     LAV  [ ie: Bison, Coyote, and  LAV IIIs] and  Leopard 2  [ Main Battle Tank ]  fleets. Aim of  CCV Project:   • To field a  Medium Weight  (30-45t)  highly  Protected  and  Mobile  Close Combat     Vehicle (CCV) in which fully-equipped  Infantry and  Forward Artillery Observation     parties will be delivered intact for close combat operations, in medium to high threat     environments, often with the intimate support of  Main Battle Tanks [MBT]. A single (24 hrs), sequential and generic tactical mission is defined as the following:   • 150km of travel on primary/secondary roads, trails, and offroads, at various speeds,     including reversing.   • Shallow ford 3 times.   • Ascend/Descend steep grades 5 times.   • Section Dismount and Remount.   • Stop, Shut-Down, and Re-Start on gradient.   • Essential Automotive & Turret systems on for 20hrs.   • Essential Communication/Navigation systems on for 24hrs.   • Fire 200 main armament rounds and 1100 coax MG rounds.   • Recovery once.   • Onboard consumption of  three (3) meals and water. Fielding Milestones:   • [Initial Operational Capability]  Eight supportable CCV planned for December 2012.   • Full Operational Capability  (FOC)  –  Planned for 2015. Update: David Pugliese has now confirmed the source for the CCV requirements and it was indeed a part of  an official briefing to industry by the Project Management Office. The introduction is odd  in describing the "deficiencies" of  the current CF  LAV fleets as a rationale for this CCV project. The deficiencies are summed up as LAVs not being MAVs (Medium Armoured Vehicle). But such 'universal negatives' add nothing to our understanding of  the CCV requirements. Nor were weight classes arrived at arbitrarily. The term 'light armoured vehicle' was highly fashionable in the 1990s but LAV covered a broad range of armour varying from 5 to 20 tons.  That rating covered the CF's AVGP (10.7 t) and Bison (13-14 t) but the LAV III (17.2 t) pushed the upper end of  that  'LAV' weight category. By the time CF LAV IIIs were fully uparmoured and equipped to meet Kandahar conditions, this formerly light vehicle was nudging the 20 tonne MAV class. In DND's 08 July 2009  Backgrounder on the CCV,  medium weight class [1] is adjusted upwards to start at 25 tonnes with the CCV "coming in between 25 and 45 tonnes". US Army research had shown that armoured vehicles hit an off-road mobility 'break-point' at 20 tons. Above that weight, wheeled vehicle performance was eclipsed by tracks.[2] In other words, the CCV's weight range all  but dictates a tracked vehicle. Listing  LAV "deficiencies" smacks of squabbling between rival NDHQ project management offices. In reality, DND purchased one class of vehicle only to have field experience show that another weight class of armour was required to fill the role of Infantry Fighting Vehicle (the class that both LAV IIIs and CCVs fall within) when exposed to powerful roadside IEDs. Left unsaid is that, in different conditions, the LAV III's lighter weight and lower impact (psychologically and on infrastructure) is both required and highly desirable. It is not a question of  the greater desirability of  medium versus light so much as 'horses for courses'.  In the current deployment, LAV IIIs are falling short. And there's the rub. The Close Combat Vehicle is not being purchased for the Afghan deployment. Current government policy is that active Canadian Forces combat participation in Afghanistan wind down between July and December 2011. It will be another full year before the first CCVs arrive (Initial Operational Capability, Dec 2012), with the fleet fully operational in 2015. DND is ' planning for the next war '. Necessary, but why not be upfront about it ? The next question is: What do these CCV tactical requirement details reveal to citizens about the direction of the CCV Project Management Office? Ammunition requirements are perhaps most revealing. This and other details will be covered in CASR In Detail. [1] Those weight classes were reinforced by US Army studies that led to the adoption of Strykers (after the loan of  32 Canadian LAV IIIs).  In planning for the 21st Century, most armies (including Canada's) chose LAVs in the 13-to-18 tonne range.  But the US Army was examining 20-25 t  "medium weight class" vehicles for the then-coming FCS. [2] These 1998-2000 studies by the US Army Corps of Engineers did acknowledge that major mobility advances were being made. So, a 25 t LAV-H MAV cannot be ruled out.