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Background  —  Sealifter Comparisons  —  San Antonio Class LPD

San Antonio as built - note enclosed masts Amphibious Landing if necessary but not necessarily Amphibious Assault
Early artist's impression - note LCACs in well US Navy  San Antonio class  vessels are meant to deliver US Marines, their vehicles, equipment, and supplies for amphibious warfare. Beneath the rear helicopter deck is a flooding ‘well’ for landing craft  (conventional or hover- craft, left).  Awkward as the ‘Landing Platform Dock’ term is, it is also a fair description of these ships’ function – LPDs are, in effect, a floating staging ground for amphibious landings. The LPD carries troops and vehicles but it also provides replenishment (supplies, potable water, ammunition, fuel, etc).

Impression of well deck with 2  loaded LCACs “Jump in the water... get wet”
There are  three  vehicle decks enclosed within the hull which can accommodate M1 tanks or any smaller vehicles.  The well deck for landing craft is aft of the vehicle decks. A rear ramp door is lowered for hovercraft (LCAC), or the well is flooded for conventional landing craft.

  Dimensions:   208m long x 32m beam x 7m draught
  Displacement:   25,300t  (full load)
  Crew / Troops:   361 / 700  (max 800 transient)
  Carrying capacity:   7500m2 lanes, 7500m3 bulk, 1,234m3 fuel
  Docking well:   2 x LCAC  (or 9 x smaller landing craft)
  Aircraft:   4 x medium / 2 x large helicopters
  Armament:   RAM or ESSM, 2 x 30mm, 12.7mm M2HB
  Countermeasures:   AN/SLQ-25A Nixie / Mk53 Nulka / ESM
  Sustained speed:   22 knots (40.7 km/h)

San Antonio class LPD cutaway Rotating Airframe Missile - Raytheon photo The San Antonio  was designed with the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey in mind.[1] Meant to operate beside the US Navy’s proposed DD(X) destroyers, the LPDs were still to be able to defend themselves. [2] Two launchers for RAM missiles are fitted but, although designed for the ESSM, no vertical launch system is actually installed. The hull was designed to minimize radar return as are the ship’s distinctive twin AEM/S (Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor systems). The result is an imposing, survivable class of vessel.

LPD-17 San Antonio nearing completion - USN photo San Antonio class in profile But events have conspired to ruin the USN’s plans. Instead of LPDs, the US finds that RO/RO transport is in higher demand. Of the original 46 planned LPDs, only 12 will now be built. Of those 12, only 9 are needed by the US. The remaining 3 may be available for export. They suit General Hillier’s image of a transformed CF, would be available far sooner than a ‘keel-up’ design, and might be a bargain. [3]

Also seeJoint Support Ship.  The JSS Project is distinct from the Amphibious Assault Ship but the two are related  (at least by budget).

[1]  The V-22 program’s fate remains uncertain, but the LPD was also designed to accommodate a range of US Navy or USMC helicopters. The landing deck was designed for 2  Sikorsky CH-53E, 4  Boeing CH-46 (equivalent to the CF CH-113 Labrador), 6  Bell AH-1, or 2  V-22s. The aircraft hangar is to house 3 of the small AH-1 attack helicopters, or 2 medium-sized CH-46, or  just 1 of the large CH-53/V-22 Ospreys.
[2] The RAM  (Rolling Airframe Missile)  is of interest to the CF since its Mk 31 launcher is derived from the Phalanx CIWS remote 20mm gun system used on Canadian ships. Likewise, the planned larger air defence missile (the Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile) is also planned for CF service (replacing existing Sea Sparrows). The close-in surface self-defence 30mm Mk 46 guns are Chain Guns like CF 25mm guns.
[3] There have been cost overruns for the San Antonio class. The first ship, LPD-17, fell 10 months behind schedule (and about 30% over budget). The final cost for this first ship in the class is expected to be over US$800M, later production ships should be less expensive. To be a bargain, Canada must ensure that DND did not end up paying for this cost overrun.  The price of LCACs should also be factored in. For more on LPD-17 production (and the state of US shipbuilding), see page 5 of James Hasik’s piece "Further delay and cost are likely" How Complexity Has Confounded Competition in Shipbuilding and Options for the Navy Department [Avondale and the San Antonio].