Canadian American Strategic Review

CASR Home

Background Air Support

Background CF18 CAS

Background Intro

In Detail Intro

Section Index

Background  –  CF-18  Ground Attack  —  CF Hornets to Kandahar?

In late September 2006,  MND Gordon O’Connor was queried about a rumoured CF-18 deployment to Kandahar. He said “I can deny it because no one’s...brought it across my desk”.[1] But things have changed.  On 30 Oct. 2006, O’Connor said  in that six  CF-18 have been committed to NATO  for use  in Afghanistan if needed. There they would join RAF Harriers and KLu F-16s (left). What has brought about this shift from an angry DND denial to a commitment?

Partly there is a sensitivity to Canadian equipment shortfalls in the region forcing the CF to rely on assistance from allies. [2]  Obviously, there is also an instinct to contribute whatever  resources we do have to NATO operations in  Afghanistan. This will  be heightened for the Air Force.  Other than transports, the only aircraft in-theatre are CU-161 Sperwer tactical UAVs  (which are due to be replaced soon by Dutch UAVs). Another element is that ‘fast jet’ Close Air Support brings with it the risk of ‘friendly fire’. CAS provided  by CF-18s might make an accident less politically touchy in Canada.

As for local politics, denials of deployments have all but become an unofficial confirmation. [3] There were overt signs – the Toronto Star reported a  $1.9M contract with the US government  to provide CF-18  “deployment  support” – and more subtle signals – 14 Airfield Engineer Squadron was scheduled to go to Kandahar Airfield in late October. [4]  KAF can use the help but  the timing is also interesting. In the end, CF troops on the ground would probably rather have tactical helicopters and more rotary-wing CAS (as provided by Dutch Apaches) but the CF-18s we have.

[1] In July of 2006, CAS LGen Steve Lucas had mused in the summer about CF-18s going to Afghanistan. This brought out similar denials. [2] Sharing equipment assets is, of course, one reasons for being in a military alliance.  However, shortfalls do make for political openings. [3] This pattern was followed with the deployment of Leopard tanks. There has always been a tendency towards excessive secrecy in the Canadian Forces and DND. Often operational security is quoted but it is hard to see how OpSec applies here. The Taliban have no means of thwarting the deployment. Nor do the insurgents care who it is who bombs them – after all, there are fighter-bombers already in-theatre. [4] 14 AES had previously deployed to Camp Mirage (Minhad AFB) in Dubai but  this was the Reserves units’ first trip into Afghanistan.